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THE RIGHT TO DEPORTATION COUNSEL IN PADILLA V. 
KENTUCKY: THE CHALLENGING CONSTRUCTION  
OF THE FIFTH-AND-A-HALF AMENDMENT 
 
Daniel Kanstroom* 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s pathbreaking decision in Padilla v. Kentucky 
seems reasonably simple and exact: Sixth Amendment norms were applied to 
noncitizen Jose Padilla’s claim that his criminal defense counsel was ineffective due 
to allegedly incorrect advice concerning the risk of deportation.  This was a very 
significant move with virtues of both logic and justice.  It will likely prevent many 
avoidable and wrongful deportations.  It may also help some deportees who have been 
wrongly or unjustly deported in the past.  However, the apparent exactness of the 
case, as a Sixth Amendment decision, raises fundamental constitutional questions.  
For more than a century, courts have formalistically distinguished between two 
consequences of criminal convictions: the punishment meted out in criminal courts 
and deportation.  The former is, of course, a criminal sanction, while the latter is said 
to be civil or, at most, quasi-criminal.  This Article suggests that Padilla has 
implicitly challenged this model with potentially powerful consequences.  Padilla 
cannot be squared with the historical, formalist relegation of deportation to the realm 
of civil collateral consequences in which there is no clear constitutional right to 
counsel.  This Article thus seeks to elucidate how the Padilla opinion might model a 
viable constitutional reconciliation between the Court’s historical formalism and 
its current realism.  This model bridges Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and 
limns a new constitutional norm for deportation that we might call the Fifth-and-a-
Half Amendment (Amendment V½).  It embodies both the flexible due process 
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment and—at least for certain types of deportation—
the more specific protections of the Sixth Amendment.  Amendment V½ is certainly 
not a perfect solution.  However, so long as deportation is formalistically understood 
as civil and nonpunitive while, in reality, being directly tied to the criminal justice 
system and highly punitive in effect, it is a legitimate and necessary construct.   
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“We are a nation of immigrants, dedicated to the rule of law . . . .”1 
 
“[T]he Court should devote some attention to bringing its Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence into a logical alignment . . . .”2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Deportation law has long been a rather challenging enterprise.  Courts 
navigate gingerly between restrictive, formalist doctrines and compelling claims 
of basic human and constitutional rights.  It is therefore unsurprising that the 
apparently straightforward majority opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky3 illustrates 
the tension between two well-known legal maxims.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
“cannot escape the demands of judging or of making the difficult appraisals 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 1. Hon. Barbara Jordan, August 1995, quoted in U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGR. REFORM, 
BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY (Sept. 30, 1997), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/becoming/full-report.pdf. 
 2. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 183 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
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inherent in determining whether constitutional rights have been violated.”4  
On the other hand, as Justice Holmes once noted, “delusive exactness is a 
source of fallacy throughout the law.”5 
The case involved the important problem of how criminal defense 
counsel ought to deal with deportation consequences.  The Court’s basic, 
pathbreaking holding seems reasonably simple and exact, and it surely made 
a “difficult appraisal”: The Sixth Amendment norms of Strickland v. 
Washington6 were applied to noncitizen Jose Padilla’s claim that his criminal 
defense counsel was ineffective due to allegedly incorrect advice concerning 
the risk of deportation.  Contrary to the opinion of the Kentucky Supreme Court 
(and others),7 such advice on deportation was not “categorically removed from 
the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel”8 even though deportation 
is nominally a civil sanction.  This was a very significant move with virtues of 
both logic and justice.  It will likely prevent many avoidable and wrongful depor-
tations in the future.  It may also help some deportees who have been wrongly 
or unjustly removed in the past.  Indeed, given the large number of people who 
likely have been deported in part because of similarly bad legal counsel in 
criminal courts, the Supreme Court’s recognition of the issue was long 
overdue.9  However, the apparent exactness of the case, as a Sixth Amendment 
decision, leaves important questions unanswered about the increasingly harsh 
state of deportation law. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 4. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963). 
 5. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 434 (1905) (“[I]t is important for this 
court to avoid extracting from the very general language of the Fourteenth Amendment a system of 
delusive exactness in order to destroy methods of taxation which were well known when that 
Amendment was adopted and which it is safe to say that no one then supposed would be disturbed.”). 
 6. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 7. See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2008); Broomes v. 
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th 
Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1985); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 
2d 990 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State v. 
Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106 (La. 2002); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989); see also 
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty 
Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) (noting that “eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, 
and the District of Columbia” held that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collateral 
consequences of a conviction, including deportation). 
 8. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 9. See generally Symposium, Overcoming Barriers to Immigrant Representation: Exploring Solutions, 
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2009) (discussing the significant need for adequate representation of 
immigrants, the consequences of immigrants’ receiving inadequate or no representation, and possible 
solutions to these problems). 
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I.! THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASICS 
The most fundamental question that is implicitly raised—but left 
unanswered—by Padilla is the constitutional understanding of deportation.  
For more than a century, many judges have relied upon a simple, formalistic 
distinction between two consequences of criminal convictions: the punishment 
meted out in criminal courts and deportation.  The former is, of course, a crimi-
nal sanction, while the latter is said to be civil or, at most, quasi-criminal.10  
Occasionally, the Supreme Court, or a Justice or two, would be troubled by the 
brittleness of this dichotomy.  The Court has, for example, noted the harshness 
of deportation as a sanction that could result “in loss of both property and life; 
or of all that makes life worth living.”11  But for the most part the formal 
distinction has long held.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has rarely, if ever, 
seriously considered the basic analytical and normative questions raised by the 
civil/criminal dichotomy in the deportation context.12  This Article suggests 
that Padilla may have implicitly opened this door with potentially powerful 
consequences.13 
Deportation is a complex, multifaceted enforcement mechanism.14  For 
the purposes of this Article, however, deportation may be adequately—if a bit 
simplistically—defined as “the removal of a noncitizen who has entered the 
United States either legally or illegally.”15  The United States has two basic forms 
of deportation which reflect two somewhat different, if interrelated, goals.  The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 10. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (holding that deportation of 
noncitizens is not criminal punishment but a civil penalty, which makes procedural protections 
of criminal trial unavailable to deportation proceedings); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 
730 (1893) (holding that deportation was civil and not punishment for constitutional purposes). 
 11. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
 12. But see infra notes 241–260 and accompanying text discussing Wong Wing v. United States, 
163 U.S. 228 (1896).  One can see glimmers of recognition of the problem in Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (allowing retroactive application of a deportation statute).  See also 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (holding that there are limits to the valid period of 
postdeportation order detention); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 
(1999) (limiting the applicability of the selective prosecution defense in deportation cases); INS 
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not 
apply in deportation hearings). 
 13. Of course, there is debate about whether these consequences would be a positive 
development.  For example, in a recent Supreme Court oral argument, Stephanos Bibas used the 
prospect of counsel in “thousands of immigration and extradition cases” as a bête noire to bolster his 
argument against a right to counsel in certain civil contempt situations.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 
37, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 504 (2010) (No. 10-10). 
 14. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 2–20 (2007) (describing different forms of deportation). 
 15. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & 
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 693 (6th ed. 2008). 
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first, extended border control, seeks to remove those noncitizens who have 
evaded the rules that govern legal entry into the United States or who violate 
the rules that govern temporary residence (for example, those who enter 
without inspection or overstay their allowed period of admission).  Another 
form, post-entry social control, regulates the conduct of those who have been 
legally admitted (for example, as students, workers, or permanent residents) 
but who then engage in a wide variety of prohibited behaviors.16  Deportation 
also comes in many procedural guises, some of which are rather formal and 
well structured, and others of which are quite informal, fast-track mechan-
isms, with names that reflect this, such as: “expedited removal,” “administra-
tive removal,” and “reinstatement of removal.”17  Indeed, much of the late 
twentieth- and early twenty-first-century story of deportation is a story of 
deformalization in which basic procedural rights developed since the late 
nineteenth-century have been severely limited in practice. 
Although violations of state laws can lead to deportation—as Padilla v. 
Kentucky demonstrates—all forms of deportation are primarily handled by 
federal agencies.  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security controls most 
of the system through its subagencies—Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), which handles most interior enforcement, and U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), which manages the border and ports of entry.18  
Formal deportation hearings take place—as they have for many decades—
before immigration judges who work under the jurisdiction of the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review within the U.S. Department of Justice.19 
Deportation, as noted, has long been held to be a civil (as opposed to a 
criminal) system.  However, it must comply with constitutional requirements 
of fundamental fairness and due process.  The Supreme Court has held that the 
fundamental protections of the Fifth Amendment “are universal in their 
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction” of the United 
States.20  As the Court has reiterated, “the Due Process Clause applies to all 
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence 
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”21  The Court has also 
sometimes differentiated the constitutional rights of noncitizens according to 
their legal status: “[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 16. See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 14. 
 17. See generally id. 
 18. See Protecting Our Borders—This Is CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (June 7, 
2010), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp.xml. 
 19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). 
 20. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 21. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
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to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status 
changes accordingly.”22 
Notwithstanding this constitutional understanding of deportation, the 
system remains in many respects harsh and anomalous.  For example, depor-
tees, regardless of their status or the type of proceeding they face, do not 
have the right to appointed counsel (if a deportee cannot afford a lawyer, she 
has no right to one), the right to bail (many thousands face mandatory 
detention every day), the right to have illegally seized evidence suppressed 
(unless the agents’ conduct was widespread or egregious),23 the right against 
ex post facto laws (a person can be deported for conduct that became a 
deportable offense since its commission),24 the right against selective prosecu-
tion (a deportee could be arrested and charged due to political associations 
and perhaps even due to national origin or ethnicity), or the right to a jury 
trial.25  Thus, any possible intrusion into this realm of a specific, substantive 
constitutional norm, such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, is 
noteworthy and potentially momentous. 
A.! The Court’s Sixth Amendment Realism 
Padilla, though essentially a criminal case, embodies a refreshingly realist 
interpretation of contemporary crime-based deportation.  Although this 
approach to deportation is somewhat tentative (that is, the Court does not 
quite say that deportation is punishment), Justice Stevens’s majority opinion 
cannot fully be squared with the historical, formalist relegation of deporta-
tion to the realm of civil collateral consequences in which there is no clear 
constitutional right to counsel.  The Court’s description of the harsh (and often 
automatic) nature of the deportation sanction makes this point clear, as does its 
specific description of the benefits of bringing deportation consequences into 
the criminal plea bargaining process.26  Indeed, whether or not one shares the 
Court’s optimism about the consequences of including deportation directly 
into plea bargaining negotiations, the assertion that “informed consideration 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 22. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); see also Zadvydas, 593 U.S. at 694 (“[T]he 
nature of [due process] protection may vary depending upon status and circumstance. . . .”). 
 23. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule generally does not apply in deportation hearings). 
 24. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593–96 (1952) (allowing retroactive application of 
deportation statute). 
 25. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (limiting the 
applicability of the selective prosecution defense in deportation cases). 
 26. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).  As discussed infra, I have substantial 
doubts that this process will necessarily be beneficial to noncitizen defendants. 
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of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and noncitizen 
defendants during the plea bargaining process”27 is a strong stamp of recognition 
of the convergence between the deportation and criminal systems.28 
This realist methodology was logically necessary to facilitate the direct 
application of the Sixth Amendment to deportation consequences.  Its 
powerful analytical implications could hold still more promise for those who 
support a robust theory of deportees’ rights.  However, a close reading of the 
opinion’s apparent constitutional exactness reveals logical gaps and com-
plexities as to the application of the Sixth Amendment to deportation.  My 
goal in this Article is not to criticize these gaps and complexities.  The two 
dissenters—Justices Scalia and Thomas—did this well enough, and their views 
should be taken seriously.29  Rather, this Article seeks to elucidate how the 
Padilla opinion might nevertheless model a viable constitutional reconciliation 
between the historical formalism that has governed deportation law and the 
Court’s realism in Padilla.  This model also bridges Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence in a way that could (and I think, should) be applied to the gen-
eral corpus of deportation law. 
B.! The Role of Counsel and Constitutional Framing 
Padilla is most directly a case about various right-to-counsel problems in 
the criminal law setting.  The decision is a watershed30 in the evolution of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 27. Id. at 1486. 
 28. See e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post–
September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 639 (2004) [hereinafter Kanstroom, 
Criminalizing the Undocumented]; Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1891 (2000) [hereinafter 
Kanstroom, Deportation & Social Control]; Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration 
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: 
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006); Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. 
Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1131 (2002). 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. The term “watershed” has some bearing on whether or not the Padilla case should apply 
retroactively, a matter that is not fully explored in this Article.  The Court did not explicitly state 
whether Padilla constituted a new rule for purposes of retroactivity, but the opinion seems to lean 
in that direction.  See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.12 (suggesting that the decision follows directly from 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1985) (explaining how Strickland applies to guilty pleas)); see also 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding that applying Strickland to particular scenarios does 
not establish a new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).  As the Court noted, “For at least 
the past 15 years, professional norms have required defense counsel to provide advice on the deporta-
tion consequences of a client’s plea.”  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.  Alternatively, the case might well 
be seen as a “watershed” in the sense of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962).  See Whorton 
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007); Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); Beard v. Banks, 542 
U.S. 406, 417 (2004); Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008) 
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standards required of lawyers representing noncitizen criminal defendants.  
The opinion asserts that “constitutionally competent counsel would have 
advised [Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation.”31  Transcending the affirmative misadvice scenario, the 
Court holds that even silence (that is, no advice about deportation) by defense 
counsel “would be fundamentally at odds with the critical obligation of coun-
sel to advise the client of ‘the advantages and disadvantages of a plea 
agreement.’”32  Indeed, the Court concludes that “the weight of prevailing 
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client 
regarding the risk of deportation.”33  This in itself is surely a very big deal, 
especially for the future training of criminal lawyers.34  It means, simply put, 
that noncitizen criminal defendants now have a right to competent deportation 
counsel in criminal court.  In Padilla, this right arose in the context of the deci-
sion whether to accept a plea bargain.  But there would seem to be no reason 
why the Padilla norms do not apply throughout the criminal process to all 
manner of other decisions, including decisions about which criminal counts 
ought to be challenged and which ones should be tried, proposed jury instruc-
tions, post-trial motions, and sentencing advocacy. Padilla’s new norms within 
the criminal process obviously raise technical and broad doctrinal questions relat-
ing to a wide array of other so-called collateral consequences and “civil Gideon” 
claims.35  This Article considers more specifically how Padilla’s constitutional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(indicating that Teague should not necessarily constrain the authority of state courts to give broader 
effect to new rules of criminal procedure). 
 31. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 32. Id. at 1484 (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50 (1995)). 
 33. Id. at 1482.  As the Court had previously noted in INS v. St. Cyr: “[T]he American Bar 
Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice provide that, if a defendant will face deportation as a result 
of a conviction, defense counsel ‘should fully advise the defendant of these consequences.’”  533 U.S. 
289, 322 n.48 (2001) (quoting 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-3.2 cmt., at 75 (2d ed. 
1982)).  Although “breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel” per Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986), 
Strickland had noted that “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . . .”  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 34. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Protocol for Development of a Public Defender Immigration Service 
Plan, IMMIGR. DEF. PROJECT (2009), available at http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/docs 
/2010/10_Public%20Defender%20Immigration%20Protocol.with%20appendice.pdf. 
 35. See, e.g., ABA, BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL LEGAL 
PROCEEDINGS (adopted Aug. 2010), available at http://www.abanow.org/2010/07/am-2010-105; ABA, 
RECOMMENDATION 112A (Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/ 
downloads/06A112A.pdf; CAL. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N’S MODEL STATUTE TASK FORCE, STATE 
BASIC ACCESS ACT §§ 401–404 (Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/at 
jresourcecenter/downloads/ca_state_basic_access_act_feb_08.pdf; Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, 
The “Major Upheaval” of Padilla v. Kentucky: Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences 
of Conviction, 25 CRIM. JUST. 36, 37 (2010) (noting that Padilla was “the first time that the Court has 
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implications might apply to civil deportation law itself36 and to the newly 
developing field of postdeportation law.37 
Much depends on constitutional framing, and Padilla is harder to frame 
than one might suspect from Justice Stevens’s opinion.  We could begin with 
an obvious, simple, but ultimately somewhat misleading question: Is Padilla a 
Sixth Amendment case or a due process case?  The Court majority proceeds for 
the most part in the Sixth Amendment vein.  The Kentucky Supreme Court 
had framed the issue this way, denying postconviction relief on the specific 
ground that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of coun-
sel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice about deporta-
tion because it is merely a collateral consequence of his conviction.38  When 
the Supreme Court majority opinion described the issue presented, however, its 
language was less constitutionally specific: 
We granted certiorari . . . to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, 
Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which 
he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country.39 
This simple phrasing masks underlying complexity.  To be sure, the 
Court’s approach to the requirements of fair criminal processes in state courts 
has moved away from general notions of fundamental fairness grounded in the 
Due Process Clause.  The modern model has commonly been described as one 
of incorporation of specific Bill of Rights provisions, a method that appears to 
be more specific and precise and that seeks greater uniformity between state 
and federal processes.40  Nevertheless, the Padilla opinion is also awash in all 
manner of due process streams.  First of all, the Sixth Amendment was applied 
to Kentucky (albeit sub silentio) through the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.41  One is reminded of Akhil Reed Amar’s observation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
applied the 1984 Strickland v. Washington standard to a lawyer’s failure to advise the client about a 
‘collateral’ consequence of conviction—something other than imprisonment, fine, probation, and the 
like, that the court imposes at sentencing”). 
 36. See Dan Kesselbrenner, A Defending Immigrants Partnership Practice Advisory: Duty of Criminal 
Defense Counsel Representing an Immigrant Defendant After Padilla v. Kentucky, IMMIGR. DEF. 
PROJECT, Apr. 6, 2010 (revised Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/ docs/2010/10-
Padilla_Practice_Advisory.pdf. 
 37. See Daniel Kanstroom, Post Deportation Human Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron or 
Necessity?, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195 (2007). 
 38. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008). 
 39. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
 40. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong With Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215 (2003). 
 41. Simply put, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates those “specific pledges of particular 
amendments [that are] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” against the states.  Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937). 
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that, though the Court may appear to be applying the Bill of Rights directly to 
the states: 
Like people with spectacles who often forget they are wearing them, 
most lawyers read the Bill of Rights through the lens of the Fourteenth 
Amendment without realizing how powerfully that lens has refracted 
what they see.42 
Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel jurisprudence, “the heartland of 
constitutional criminal procedure,”43 has never been fully independent from due 
process ideas, especially when applied to the states.  Indeed, notwithstanding 
the vigorous debates among twentieth-century Justices about incorporation, the 
modern Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel idea is best viewed as a subsidiary 
category of broader norms.  As Hugo Black wrote in 1938, the safeguards of the 
Sixth Amendment were “deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights 
of life and liberty.”44  It was, he continued, one of the “essential barriers against 
arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights . . . . [It is] a constant admonition 
that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be 
done.’”45  The Court has often reiterated this principle as that of a “fair trial.”46  
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 42. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 7 (1998). 
 43. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 
89 (1997). 
 44. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (citing Palko, 302 U.S. at 325). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Of course, the Court has viewed the Sixth Amendment as applicable beyond the trial stage 
itself, including pleas.  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1985) (the Strickland test applies to 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in bargaining).  Although it is said that the current Sixth 
Amendment “critical stage” analysis is essentially “designed to protect the fairness of the trial itself,” this 
surely does not mean only the formal trial.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238–39 (1973); 
see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 322 (1973).  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is said to 
“attach” once adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against the defendant.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187–88 (1984).  This may happen by way of “formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”  Id. at 188 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 
U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)).  It may also attach whenever an individual makes an initial 
appearance before a magistrate for a probable cause determination and the setting of bail.  See Rothgery 
v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008).  After a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches, he or she has a right to the advice of counsel “at any stage of the prosecution, formal or 
informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair 
trial.”  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).  The Supreme Court has referred to such a 
stage as a “critical stage” of a criminal proceeding.  Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 n.5 (1986); 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985).  The Court has recognized that certain pretrial events 
may so prejudice the outcome of the defendant’s prosecution that, as a practical matter, the defendant 
must be represented at those events in order to enjoy genuinely effective assistance at trial.  See, e.g., 
Ash, 413 U.S. at 309–10; Wade, 388 U.S. at 226.  Thus, an indigent defendant is entitled to the 
assistance of appointed counsel at a preliminary hearing if “substantial prejudice . . . inheres in 
the . . . confrontation” and “counsel [may] help avoid that prejudice.”  Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 
9 (1970) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
59, 60 (1963) (per curiam).  The assistance of counsel is also guaranteed at a pretrial lineup because “the 
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In 1967, for example, the Court hearkened back to Powell v. Alabama47 to 
conceptualize the right to counsel: 
In sum, the principle of Powell . . . and succeeding cases requires that 
we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine 
whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defen-
dant’s basic right to a fair trial . . . .48 
Justice O’Connor put it similarly in Strickland v. Washington—the case that 
undergirds Padilla: 
In a long line of cases . . . this Court has recognized that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the 
fundamental right to a fair trial.  The Constitution guarantees a fair trial 
through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a 
fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, 
including the Counsel Clause . . . .49 
Padilla, even on its most narrow reading, must therefore be understood as an 
elaboration of both Fifth and Sixth Amendment constitutional guarantees as they 
apply in the criminal setting and, perhaps, as they apply to deportation itself.50   
This dualistic framing comports with various reasons for the right to 
counsel.  Some reasons are specific to the criminal process, such as ensuring 
that the innocent are not wrongly convicted, avoiding wrongful punishment, 
and promoting truth-seeking trials.  Others are more general, such as promoting 
parity between the defendant and the government in the adversarial process, 
and protecting fairness and dignity.51  Decisions in this realm typically mix these 
various factors in ways that are not always especially consistent.  Consider in 
this regard the debates over whether there was a right to counsel in misdemeanor 
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confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to 
elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which 
might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.”  Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.  The Court has, 
however, rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment entitles the criminal defendant to the 
assistance of appointed counsel at a probable cause hearing.  See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122–23 
(1975) (ruling that the Fourth Amendment hearing “is addressed only to pretrial custody” and has an 
insubstantial effect on the defendant’s trial rights). 
 47. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 48. Wade, 388 U.S. at 218; see also Ash, 413 U.S. at 300. 
 49. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984) (emphasis added) (citing Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458; Powell, 287 U.S. 45). 
 50. For a similar insight regarding the relationship between Escobedo and Miranda, see HENRY J. 
FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, in BENCHMARKS 266, 266–67 (1967) (predicting that most people 
eventually would see Escobedo as a Fifth and not a Sixth Amendment decision). 
 51. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 42, at 89–144; Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and 
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 68 (2000). 
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cases.  As one commentator noted, before the Court resolved the issue in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin:52 
It is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the trial of a 
petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice to the accused 
of the charges, or that in such cases, the defendant has no right to 
confront his accusers or to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf.53 
The Court later rejected the premise that “since prosecutions for crimes 
punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may be tried without a 
jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer.”54  The majority, unconvinced 
that the legal and constitutional questions involved in such a case “are any 
less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or more,”55 
held that “[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence 
of a fair trial.”56 
This recognition of the deep connection between the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, with its attendant complexity, does not, of course, necessarily 
demand a revision of the constitutional understanding of deportation law, in 
which fundamental fairness is still the dominant due process model.  Padilla’s 
logic, however, seems to call this methodological divide into serious question.  
Indeed, any contrary interpretation would have to explain why the entire first 
section of the Court’s opinion is about how the “landscape of federal immi-
gration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years.”57 One of the opi-
nion’s most interesting features is the way the Court straddles the civil/criminal 
and punitive/regulatory lines in its understanding of deportation. Such 
welcome realism about deportation has largely, though not completely, 
overcome historical formalism.  I suggest that it may have crafted a new consti-
tutional norm. 
C.! The Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment 
The Padilla opinion, as noted, does not recognize deportation itself as a 
criminal sanction or punishment for constitutional purposes.  Had it done so, 
then the direct application of the Sixth Amendment would have been 
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 52. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 53. John M. Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 705 
(1968). 
 54. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30–31. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 31. 
 57. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
The Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment 1473 
!
!
obligatory.  Nor, on the other hand, did the Court reaffirm the venerable 
doctrine that deportation is completely civil and collateral.  Had it done that, 
then the case could only have been resolved through Fifth Amendment due 
process analysis. 
Justice Stevens sought a middle way, noting that deportation “as a conse-
quence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the 
criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral 
consequence.”58  The collateral-versus-direct distinction is, he wrote, “ill-suited 
to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deporta-
tion.”59  Thus, deportation is now neither categorically covered by Sixth 
Amendment protection nor “categorically removed from the ambit of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel”60 in which, to reiterate, it would be consi-
dered only under the more general rubric of the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause.61  So we must confront a profound and complex question in 
the wake of Padilla: What is the constitutional status of deportation?  Before 
we can get to that, however, we must refine the question a bit more.  The 
case, we should recall, involved the deportation of a long-term legal perma-
nent resident due to a criminal conviction.  This, as noted above, is a specific 
type of deportation case that is distinct from the deportation of an 
undocumented noncitizen due to illegal entry or a visa overstay.62  Thus, the 
specific question raised by Padilla is: What is the constitutional status of post-
entry social control deportation? 
The Padilla Court’s rejection of a formalist categorization of deportation as 
simply civil and nonpunitive is—as I have long argued—conceptually correct 
and long overdue.63  But the devil is in the doctrinal details.  Padilla leaves us 
with a complex constitutional model for deportation and with two rather dif-
ferent approaches to right-to-counsel claims relating to deportation.  Certain 
deportation issues that arise in criminal courts are now governed specifically by 
the Sixth Amendment, albeit with a due process foundation (or, if you pre-
fer, an emanation or penumbra).  The Court’s admonition to criminal lawyers 
as to those types of cases was clear: “[C]onstitutionally competent counsel 
would have advised [Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made him 
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 58. Id. at 1482 (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
 62. See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 14. 
 63. See e.g., Kanstroom, Deportation & Social Control, supra note 28 at 1891; Daniel 
Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 61 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2000) 
[hereinafter Kanstroom, Deportation & Justice]. 
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subject to automatic deportation.”64 All lawyers involved in the criminal justice 
system—prosecutors as well as defense counsel—must now take deportation 
into account at all stages of the criminal process.65  This will likely be salutary 
for many noncitizens charged with crime.  It should also facilitate better 
outcomes as it will decrease the chances of accidental deportations caused by 
inadvertence in criminal courts. 
So far so good (or at least so far pretty good—there are complexities 
even at this analytical stage that I will discuss below).  But does Padilla inform 
right-to-counsel claims in civil deportation proceedings themselves?66 The 
issue is a profoundly serious one.  Lack of counsel and lack of effective counsel 
in deportation proceedings are major problems that have negatively affected 
many hundreds of thousands of deportees.67 Indeed, wrongful deportations 
(that is, deportations based on mistakes of fact or law) will, I believe, come to 
be seen as among the most shameful legal phenomena of our time.68  In recent 
years, even some U.S. citizens have found themselves deported, a situation 
that violates more laws and more legal principles than one can count.  We 
also know that many noncitizen deportees should never have been deported, 
even though they may have had formal deportation hearings.  Mistakes have 
been made for a wide range of reasons. Some deportees simply gave up 
fighting their cases because they could not stand to remain in immigration 
detention.  Many deportees lacked immigration counsel or they had inade-
quate counsel.  As the Padilla case highlights, many criminal defense lawyers 
have had no awareness of possible immigration consequences and have advised 
noncitizens badly. Administrative and judicial review has been severely 
limited—and so on.  Still, there is no recourse in many such cases, either in crim-
inal or in immigration court. 
All of this, and—as we shall see—more, adds up to a powerful indictment 
of the accuracy and the justice of the deportation system.  It indicates that 
many thousands of deportees have reasonable claims that they should still be in 
the United States with their families.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized 
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 64. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 65. See Markowitz, supra note 34. 
 66. Such claims are not typically analyzed under the Sixth Amendment rubric but through Fifth 
Amendment due process methods. 
 67. See Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, 
Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGR. (2010), 
available at http://new.abanet.org/immigration/pages/default.aspx (noting that more than half of the 
noncitizens in removal proceedings, and 84 percent of the detained ones, lacked legal representation, 
which “calls into question the fairness of a convoluted and complicated process”). 
 68. Of course, accuracy is not the only criterion by which one measures the quality of a legal 
system.  But surely it matters.  There is, after all, a reason why the well-known and highly influential 
“Innocence Project” was not called the “Disproportionality Project.” 
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that the government theory of deportation in many cases involving lawful 
permanent residents was fundamentally flawed.69 The full scope of this problem 
can probably never be accurately measured.  But consider the fact that millions 
of people have been deported in the last fifteen years and imagine even a 1 or 2 
percent error rate (which would be a rather positive accomplishment for the 
agencies involved.)  Even a 1 percent error rate would mean some 80,000–
100,000 mistakes just over the past few years, including refugees, asylum 
seekers, and many thousands of long-term legal residents.  This, I suggest, is the 
backdrop against which the constitutional implications of the Padilla case 
should be considered. 
Thus, it is worth serious thought whether Padilla could herald the 
recognition of a new constitutional norm for (at least) the post-entry social 
control type of deportation that would account for both the harshness and the 
complexity of deportation.  This norm, which we might call the Fifth-and-a-
Half Amendment (Amendment V½) embodies both the flexible due process 
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment and—at least for certain types of 
deportation—the more specific protections of the Sixth Amendment.70  What 
this model lacks in exactness, it makes up for with a moderately bounded 
flexibility that pays attention to the real nature of modern deportation in its 
various guises.  Though originalists and textualists might argue that my very 
naming of Amendment V½ proves its illegitimacy, the counter to that argu-
ment is strong: So long as deportation is formalistically understood as civil and 
nonpunitive while, in reality, being tied directly to the criminal justice system 
and punitive in effect, Amendment V½ is a legitimate construct.  It appro-
priately imbues the fundamental fairness required by the Fifth Amendment 
with certain constitutional protections due to criminal defendants.  It is also 
the best way to make complete logical sense of Padilla.   
It is not, of course, a panacea.  Indeed, criminal law specialists may be 
amused at how much the application of Strickland seems to mean to those who 
represent deportees.  Critics of Strickland argue that it reduced a conglomeration 
of constitutional ideals down to one word—fairness—and that this requires 
very little.  “[A] conviction will be branded as ‘unfair’ only if ‘there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 69. See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010); Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 
47 (2006); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 70. This model also implies that the ex post facto clauses and the prohibition of bills of attainder 
ought to apply to certain types of deportation.  Cf. Alvarado-Fonseca v. Holder, 631 F.3d 385, 391–92 
(7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting this argument notwithstanding Padilla). 
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proceeding would have been different.’”71  “Unfairness was thus reduced one 
step further to mean actual unreliability.”72  As Steven Bright has commented: 
“Much less than mediocre assistance passes muster under the Strickland stan-
dard.”73  Still, for deportees, even this is a major step forward. 
Various implications of this new norm are apparent, but an obvious first 
one is that Amendment V½ strongly cuts against decisions like the one rendered 
at the eleventh hour by then–Attorney General Michael Mukasey in Matter of 
Compean.74  That case, now overturned by Attorney General Eric Holder but 
not necessarily fully repudiated, called into question whether a deportee has any 
sort of strong constitutional right to reopen a case due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  According to Mukasey’s view, deportees had only a statutory privi-
lege to retain counsel of their own choosing.  Put simply, even if deportation 
counsel was incompetent, fraudulent, asleep, or failed to appear, Mukasey held 
that such a hearing would not necessarily be fundamentally unfair.75 The 
Mukasey opinion overruled two longstanding Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) decisions that had recognized a right to effective counsel.  In the first 
decision, Matter of Lozada, the BIA had concluded that ineffective assistance of 
counsel was a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment “if the 
proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from 
reasonably presenting his case.”76 Fifteen years later, this principle was reaffirmed 
in a second decision, Matter of Assaad, despite intervening Supreme Court 
decisions from the criminal context that suggested that there can be no 
constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel without constitutional 
right to counsel.77  Before Mukasey’s decision in Compean, the BIA had applied 
Lozada and Assaad in many cases to conclude that an immigrant’s right to 
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 71. Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon’s Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the 
Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 363, 379 (2003) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Steven B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the 
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1858 (1994); see also Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1088–92 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation in a case in which the defendant was represented at 
trial by an attorney who, at the guilt phase, gave no opening statement, presented no defense case, 
conducted cursory cross-examination, made no objections, and then emphasized the horror of the crime 
in brief closing remarks); William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical 
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995). 
 74. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (B.I.A. 2009) (concluding that because there was no constitutional 
right to counsel in deportation proceedings, the attorney general could craft a new, stricter framework 
for reopening cases based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 75. Id. at 724–27 (overruling In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988); In re Assaad, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 553 (B.I.A. 2003)). 
 76. In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638. 
 77. In re Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 558. 
The Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment 1477 
!
!
effective assistance of counsel was violated.78  The Padilla model of Amendment 
V½ would avoid vicissitudes of this type and would mandate a much more robust 
and stable right to pursue such claims in deportation cases. 
Further, the norms of Amendment V½ could also support claims made by 
those who may have been wrongly deported due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel and perhaps for other reasons.  In this realm, however, various procedural 
and conceptual hurdles abound, including questions of Padilla’s retroactive 
application, limits on habeas claims, time limitations on state court motions, 
jurisdictional limitations on motions to reopen in deportation proceedings, the 
exercise of discretion in immigration proceedings, and difficulties of proof.79 
Still, the interpretation of Padilla matters greatly.  For more than a decade, 
many have decried the state of deportation law.  Harsh 1996 laws known by 
their acronyms—AEDPA and IIRIRA80—reflected a rather broad-brush crime 
control justification for deportation and radically changed and expanded the 
system.  Together with the increasing real-world convergence between the crim-
inal justice and deportation systems, the harshness of deportation compels “a 
rethinking of the foundational principles underlying the constitutional status 
of deportation.”81  Also, it has long seemed both logical and just that some of 
the constitutional norms applicable to criminal cases should inform our approach 
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 78. See, e.g., In re Cortez-Bravo, No. A091 058 599, 2008 WL 5537824 (B.I.A. Dec. 23, 2008); 
In re Weiqing He, No. A094 922 047, 2008 WL 5244716 (B.I.A. Dec. 2, 2008); In re Grijalva, 21 I. & 
N. Dec. 472, 473–74 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 79. See, e.g., Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding, in a case involving a wrongful 
deportation of a permanent resident alien without notice to his counsel, that deportation in 
derogation of the right to counsel was not a “departure” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c)).  A departure 
sufficient to preclude subsequent judicial review meant “legally executed” departure and not 
“departure in contravention of procedural due process.”  Id. at 958 (internal citations omitted); see also 
Thorsteinsson v. INS, 724 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1984); Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819, 820–
21 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 80. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C. 
(1999)) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 
18 U.S.C.), were passed in the chaotic aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing.  Among other 
features, the 1996 laws: (1) radically changed many grounds of exclusion and deportation; (2) 
retroactively expanded criminal grounds of deportation; (3) eliminated some and limited other 
discretionary waivers of deportability; (4) created mandatory detention for many classes of non-
citizens; (5) expedited deportation procedures for certain types of cases; (6) eliminated judicial review of 
certain types of deportation (removal) orders; (7) vastly increased possible state and local law 
enforcement involvement in deportation; and (8) created a new type of streamlined removal 
proceeding—permitting the use of secret evidence—for noncitizens accused of terrorist activity. 
 81. Kanstroom, Deportation & Social Control, supra note 28, at 1892; see also Kanstroom, 
Deportation & Justice, supra note 63. 
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to deportation far more specifically than they have in the past.82  The Padilla 
Court has taken a major step in this direction with its implicit creation of 
Amendment V½.  But in many respects we are still at a crossroads and, as the 
poet Antonio Machado put it many years ago, no hay camino; se hace camino al 
andar—“There is no road; the road is made by walking.”83 
II.! THE FACTS AND ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE SUPREME COURT 
Jose Padilla had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for 
over forty years before he was indicted on October 31, 2001.  He was alleged to 
have been caught driving a truck loaded with marijuana, along with some drug 
paraphernalia.  The charges included possession of marijuana, possession of 
drug paraphernalia, trafficking in marijuana (an amount greater than five 
pounds), and operating a truck without a weight and distance tax number.  
After conferring with counsel, he pled guilty to three misdemeanor drug-related 
charges and the Commonwealth of Kentucky dismissed the vehicular violation.84  
This seems to have been a rather good result from the perspective of the criminal 
justice system, but as a direct result of the plea, he faced deportation. 
In postconviction proceedings, he claimed that his criminal counsel not 
only had failed to advise him about the deportation consequence, but actually 
had told him not to worry about deportation since he had lived in this country 
so long.  Padilla asserted that he would have gone to trial had he not received 
the incorrect legal advice.  Such assertions are often read with great skepticism 
by courts, especially after serious charges have been substantially reduced.  
Padilla’s arguments, however, were buttressed by his new lawyer’s assertion that 
his knowledge of the truck’s contents would have been a major triable issue in 
the case.  Still, the trial judge summarily denied his motion without even 
granting him an evidentiary hearing.85 
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 82. See Kanstroom, Deportation & Social Control, supra note 28, at 1892; see also Kanstroom, 
Deportation & Justice, supra note 63. 
 83. “Proverbios y cantares XXIX” [Proverbs and Songs 29], Campos de Castilla (1912), in 
SELECTED POEMS OF ANTONIO MACHADO (Betty Jean Craige trans., La. State Univ. Press 1979). 
 84. Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at *2 (Ky. 
Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006). 
 85. Part of the trial court’s reasoning was that Padilla’s bond had been changed because he was 
suspected of being “an illegal alien.”  Thus, said the judge, he must have been aware of the possibility of 
deportation.  Moreover, the trial court noted that Padilla’s counsel did discuss the deportation issue with 
him (albeit incorrectly).  The court concluded that: “Padilla’s counsel does not make a deportation 
decision and neither does this Court.”  Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying RCr 
11.42 Motion, at 3–4 (cited in Padilla, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at *3); see also Commonwealth v. 
Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). 
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary 
hearing.  Although the Kentucky Supreme Court had held that so-called colla-
teral consequences were outside the scope of representation required by the 
Sixth Amendment and that failure of defense counsel to advise the defendant 
of possible deportation consequences was not cognizable as a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel,86 the Court of Appeals panel found Padilla’s case distin-
guishable.  The panel reasoned that, although collateral consequences do not 
have to be advised, “an affirmative act of ‘gross misadvice’ relating to collateral 
matters can justify post-conviction relief.”87 The Court of Appeals thus found 
that counsel’s wrong advice in the trial court regarding deportation could 
perhaps constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.88 
The Kentucky Supreme Court was not persuaded by this.  It reversed the 
appeals court decision and found no possible exceptions to its categorical ruling 
about the scope of the Sixth Amendment.  The court concluded: 
As collateral consequences are outside the scope of the guarantee of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s failure to 
advise Appellee of such collateral issue[s] or his act of advising Appellee 
incorrectly provides no basis for relief.89 
Essentially, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla’s claims on the 
bright-line, formalistic ground that the Sixth Amendment’s effective-assistance-
of-counsel guarantee did not protect defendants even from clearly erroneous 
deportation advice because deportation was merely a collateral consequence 
of a conviction.90  There were two dissenters from the decision, but they, too, 
apparently agreed with the Court’s basic framework as to collateral conse-
quences.  Nevertheless, for reasons upon which they did not much elaborate, the 
dissenters thought that it was not “too much of a burden to place on our 
defense bar the duty to say, ‘I do not know.’”91 Whether they were implicitly 
thinking of due process norms or only the Sixth Amendment, it is impossible 
to know for sure. 
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 86. Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005). 
 87. Padilla, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at *7. 
 88. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483–84. 
 89. In neither instance is the matter required to be addressed by counsel, and thus an attorney’s 
failure in that regard cannot constitute ineffectiveness entitling a criminal defendant to relief under 
Strickland v. Washington. 
 90. In one sense, this might be seen as the inverse of the Wong Wing methodology.  See infra Part 
IV.C.1.  In Wong Wing, the late nineteenth-century U.S. Supreme Court pierced the veil of deportation 
proceedings to examine the real nature of a hard labor sanction, whereas the Kentucky Supreme Court 
was unwilling to pierce the veil of the criminal process to examine the nature of deportation. 
 91. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485 (Cunningham, J., dissenting). 
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III.! READING THE SUPREME COURT’S PADILLA OPINION(S) 
A.! Justice Stevens’s Majority Opinion 
1.! Is (“Automatic”) Deportation “Collateral”? 
Padilla’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court 
highlighted two major questions raised by the case, and it framed them 
quite precisely.  The first question was whether “the mandatory deportation 
associated with a plea to an ‘aggravated felony’ . . . can still be described as a 
‘collateral consequence’ of a criminal conviction which relieves counsel from 
any affirmative duty to advise.”92 The second, narrower question, was 
“whether an attorney’s ‘flagrant’ or ‘gross’ misadvice on a collateral matter, 
such as mandatory deportation, can constitute grounds for setting aside the 
guilty plea.”93 
One would have thought the second question more likely to be resolved 
favorably by the Supreme Court than the first.  The affirmative misadvice excep-
tion had already been accepted by many courts and would not have required 
major restructuring of any prior Supreme Court precedent.  Indeed, it was a 
rule that the solicitor general supported.  As it turned out, however, the first 
question’s focus on mandatory deportation became the centerpiece of the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning and this, to a large degree, obviated the need to 
consider the second question at all. 
Essentially, the Supreme Court, by a 7–2 margin, rejected the Kentucky 
Supreme Court’s wholly formalistic approach.  Justice Alito and Chief Justice 
Roberts concurred, but only as to misadvice.94  The Court’s basic holding was 
that the Sixth Amendment now requires that criminal defense counsel advise 
at least some noncitizens about at least some types of immigration conse-
quences before tendering a guilty plea. As the Court put it: “[C]onstitu-
tionally competent counsel would have advised [Padilla] that his conviction 
for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation.”95 
Padilla thus implicitly rejects the historical view of deportation as a civil 
collateral consequence of the criminal justice system, like losing the right to 
vote, eviction from public housing, or the loss of the right to possess firearms.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 92. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *7, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-
651). 
 93. Id. at *7–8. 
 94. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, dissented.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494–97 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 1478 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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However, the opinion seems to vacillate among three positions about the 
direct-versus-collateral distinction itself.  In some passages the Court seems to 
maintain the distinction.  In others the Court seems to eliminate (or mitigate) 
it.  And in others it suggests that, at least in this particular context, the 
distinction is irrelevant.  Compare, for example, the following excerpts from 
the majority opinion: 
•! We, however, have never applied a distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally “reasonable professional assistance” required 
under Strickland . . . .96 
•! Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we 
need not consider in this case because of the unique nature 
of deportation.97 
•! We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly 
severe “penalty,” . . . but it is not, in a strict sense, a 
criminal sanction.  Although removal proceedings are civil 
in nature, . . . deportation is nevertheless intimately related 
to the criminal process.  Our law has enmeshed criminal 
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century, . . . .  And, importantly, recent changes in our immi-
gration law have made removal nearly an automatic result 
for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.  Thus, we find it 
“most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the conviction 
in the deportation context.98 
•! Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, 
because of its close connection to the criminal process, 
uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral 
consequence.  The collateral versus direct distinction is thus 
ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the spe-
cific risk of deportation.99 
Although these formulations cut in somewhat different directions, it is 
clear that—taken as a whole—the Padilla opinion has confirmed the tacit 
movement of deportation law out of civil law’s formalist realm.  What is now 
required is a more functionalist discourse in which the nature of the partic-
ular type of deportation at issue will matter.  It appears that some forms of 
deportation in some settings are now directly governed by Sixth Amendment 
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 96. Id. at 1481 (citations omitted). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (citations omitted). 
 99. Id. at 1482. 
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norms, while others are to be analyzed as due process Fifth Amendment 
questions, perhaps with some Sixth Amendment framing.  Post-entry social 
control deportation is now, one might say, subject to Amendment V½. 
Essentially the Padilla case resolved both a temporal as well as a substan-
tive problem: Deportation—which by itself is not protected by the Sixth 
Amendment—flows from and comes after a criminal conviction, but it is now 
viewed as an inextricable part of the criminal process.  In 2002, the Court 
considered a somewhat analogous question in Alabama v. Shelton:100 Where the 
State had provided no counsel to an indigent defendant, does the Sixth 
Amendment permit activation of a suspended sentence upon the defendant’s 
violation of the terms of probation?  The Court concluded that it does not.  
The logic was simple: “A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the 
offense of conviction.  Once the prison term is triggered, the defendant is incar-
cerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying offense.  The 
uncounseled conviction at that point ‘results in imprisonment.’”101  This, held 
the Court, is precisely what the Sixth Amendment does not allow.  The 
analogy to Padilla may be seen in the argument raised by Charles Fried as ami-
cus curiae by invitation of the Court.  Fried sought to align the Shelton issue 
with prior Court decisions in Nichols v. United States102 and Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli.103  The question in Nichols was whether the Sixth Amendment barred 
consideration of a defendant’s prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in 
determining his sentence for a subsequent felony offense.104  The Court held 
that it did not.  In Gagnon, the Court ordered a case-by-case approach to 
determine whether counsel was required in probation and parole revocation 
hearings.  This method would focus on the nature of the issues involved.105  
Considered together, Fried contended, Nichols and Gagnon established that 
“sequential proceedings must be analyzed separately for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, and only those proceedings ‘result[ing] in immediate actual 
imprisonment’ trigger the right to state-appointed counsel.”106  Note that this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 100. 535 U.S. 654 (2002). 
 101. Id. at 662 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994)). 
 102. 511 U.S. at 740. 
 103. 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (adopting a case-by-case assessment of the need for counsel). 
 104. Nichols had pleaded guilty to federal felony drug charges.  Several years earlier, however, 
unrepresented by counsel, he had been fined for the state misdemeanor of driving under the influence 
(DUI).  Including the DUI conviction in the federal sentencing guidelines calculation allowed the trial 
court to impose a sentence for the felony drug conviction twenty-five months longer than if the 
misdemeanor conviction had not been considered.  Nichols, 511 U.S. at 741. 
 105. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788–91. 
 106. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 663 (2002) (citing Brief of Charles Fried et al. as Amicus 
Curiae by Invitation of the Court at 11–18, Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (No. 00-1214), 2001 WL 1631562, at 
*7–10). 
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logic, had it been accepted, could have been applied both to the issue raised in 
Padilla and to a possible claim to a right to counsel in deportation proceedings.  
But the Court did not accept this logic in Shelton.  Rather, it held that “[t]he 
dispositive factor in [Nichols and Gagnon] was not whether incarceration 
occurred immediately or only after some delay.  Rather, the critical point was 
that the defendant had a recognized right to counsel when adjudicated guilty 
of the felony for which he was imprisoned.”107  For Shelton, revocation of 
probation would trigger a prison term imposed for a misdemeanor of which 
Shelton was found guilty without the aid of counsel.  Thus, held the Court, 
“neither Nichols nor Gagnon altered or diminished Argersinger’s command 
that ‘no person may be imprisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented 
by counsel at his trial.’”108 The Sixth Amendment inquiry “trains on the stage 
of the proceedings . . . where[ ] guilt was adjudicated, eligibility for impri-
sonment established, and prison sentence determined.”109 Unlike Shelton, 
however, Padilla does not separate the two proceedings but, in effect, nests 
one within the other and then applies the Sixth Amendment to them both.110  
This is a major difference. 
2.! Misadvice Versus No Advice 
As we consider the significance and the legitimacy of Amendment V½, it 
is worth recalling that the debate over misadvice in this setting is not a new 
one.111  As Judge Jerome Frank wrote in a 1954 dissent from a decision affirming 
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 107. Id. at 664. 
 108. Id. (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)). 
 109. Id. at 665. 
 110. One might also see analogies between Padilla and the Court’s holdings in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “any fact” other than that of a prior conviction “that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting in part) (holding that the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced 
sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact 
(other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant).  See also 
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (upholding a state sentencing regime that allowed judges to find 
facts justifying the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences of incarceration); 
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (applying the Apprendi rule in striking down California’s 
scheme that allowed judges to issue longer prison terms based on their own fact-finding); United States 
v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. LaGrou Distribution Sys., Inc., 466 F.3d 585 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (applying Apprendi to fines).  But see United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 
2010) (holding that Apprendi does not to apply to fines). 
 111. See United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1353–54 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Under appropriate 
circumstances the fact that a defendant has been misled as to the consequence of deportability may 
render his guilty plea subject to attack.  Insofar as a contrary view may be inferred from United States v. 
Parrino on the ground that deportability is only a ‘collateral consequence’ of conviction, we agree with 
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the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea112 that had involved similar 
facts to Padilla: 
When a lawyer gives his client an erroneous opinion on a question the 
correct answer to which, by no stretch of the imagination, could be consi-
dered doubtful, and the client, relying on that opinion, enters a plea of 
guilty which will disastrously affect his future life, it is hard to understand 
how it can be maintained that “manifest injustice” has not occurred.  If 
not, I wonder how manifest the injustice must be.113 
In the following half-century, as deportation cases increased in both 
number and severity, some courts held that such affirmative misadvice about 
deportation could justify the withdrawal of a guilty plea.114  As early as 1985, 
the Eleventh Circuit found that affirmative misrepresentation regarding immi-
gration consequences, coupled with the likelihood that the petitioner would 
be imprisoned and executed after deportation, could be ineffective assistance of 
counsel.115  Most notably, in 2002, the Second Circuit held that an affirmative 
misrepresentation regarding immigration consequences was deficient under 
Strickland.116  Counsel in that case had not merely failed to advise the client 
regarding deportation consequences.  In response to the client’s inquiry, coun-
sel had assured her that, although deportation was a possibility, “there were 
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Professor Moore: ‘the vigorous dissent of Judge Frank [in Parrino] more likely reflects the present attitude 
of the federal judiciary.’” (citations omitted)). 
 112. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d). 
 113. United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 926 (2d Cir. 1954) (Frank, J., dissenting). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Couto, 
311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 
686 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2001); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 
P.3d 930, 935 (Utah 2005). 
 115. See Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540–41 (11th Cir. 1985).  Other 
federal courts had suggested, hypothetically, that an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel that the 
accused would not be deported could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and thus could 
invalidate a guilty plea.  In United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam), although 
the court held that counsel’s failure to inform the accused of the immigration consequences of his guilty 
plea did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the court further reasoned that “since [defense 
counsel] does not aver that he made an affirmative misrepresentation, [the defendant] fails to state a 
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 704; see also United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787, 
790 (2d Cir. 1973).  In Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam), the court 
approved the district court’s denial of a section 2255 motion “because there was no showing that either 
the prosecution or [the defendant’s] counsel had made any promise to [the defendant] that deportation 
would ensue on his plea.”  Id. at 986; see also United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (“Under appropriate circumstances the fact that a defendant has been misled as to [the] 
consequence of deportability may render his guilty plea subject to attack.”). 
Also, in People v. Correa, 465 N.E.2d 507 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), the court held that “where defense 
counsel has unequivocally represented to his client that [a guilty] plea will not result in his deportation 
and the defendant has relied upon this patently erroneous advice in deciding to plead guilty, post-
conviction relief is appropriate to permit the defendant to plead anew . . . . ”  Id. at 512. 
 116. United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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many things that could be done to prevent her from being deported . . . .”117  
This, unfortunately, was incorrect, according to the court: 
[B]ecause the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act eliminated all discretion as to deportation of non-citizens convicted 
of aggravated felonies, her plea of guilty meant virtually automatic, 
unavoidable deportation.118 
As a result, the Second Circuit found that counsel had affirmatively 
misrepresented the deportation consequences of the guilty plea and that such 
an affirmative misrepresentation was objectively unreasonable, particularly in 
light of contemporary standards of attorney competence.  These strands of 
affirmative misadvice and automatic deportation were similarly woven together 
in Padilla.119 
3.! “Virtually Inevitable” Deportation and the Powerful Recognition 
of Convergence 
Apart from the central right-to-counsel concerns presented in Padilla, the 
Court majority was clearly concerned about two interrelated issues: First, as 
noted, was the current nature of deportation law; second was the problem of 
how the Court’s decision might relate to prior Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
precedents.  The opinion begins with a powerful assertion that seems designed 
to address both concerns: 
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over 
the last 90 years.  While once there was only a narrow class of deporta-
ble offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to 
prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded 
the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alle-
viate the harsh consequences of deportation.  The “drastic measure” of 
deportation or removal, . . . is now virtually inevitable for a vast number 
of noncitizens convicted of crimes.120 
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 117. Id. at 183. 
 118. Id. at 183–84. 
 119. Courts had periodically focused on the automatic nature of deportation for many years 
before Padilla.  But this was typically done to justify a denial of relief.  As Judge Kaufman wrote in 
Santelises, 476 F.2d at 790: 
Moreover, we should emphasize that deportation under section 1546 is not “automatic”.  
Although 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) does allow deportation of any alien who has violated sec. 1546, 
without proof that the crime is one of moral turpitude, deportation results, however, only 
upon “order of the Attorney General” who retains discretion whether or not to institute 
such proceedings. 
 120. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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This virtually inevitable prong, as noted, is not a completely new idea.  However, 
its unique importance in Padilla is that it enabled the Court to build an analytic 
bridge between criminal prosecution and deportation without going too far too 
fast.  Thus, the majority concluded that: 
The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of 
crimes has never been more important.  These changes confirm our view 
that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed 
on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.121 
The Court cited with approval a 1986 Second Circuit case, Janvier v. 
United States, that had held that a former legal provision, known as a Judicial 
Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD), properly invoked Sixth 
Amendment scrutiny.122  The JRAD had originated in the 1917 Immigration 
Act.  It provided that at the time of sentencing or within thirty days thereafter, 
the sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to 
make a recommendation “that such alien shall not be deported.”123 This 
procedure was “consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge 
conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be 
disregarded as a basis for deportation.”124  Thus, wrote Justice Stevens: 
[F]rom 1917 forward, there was no such creature as an automatically 
deportable offense.  Even as the class of deportable offenses expanded, 
judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a case-by-
case basis.125 
In 1986, the Second Circuit held that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel applied to a JRAD request or to the lack thereof.  In its view, seeking 
a JRAD was part of the sentencing process, even if deportation itself was still 
a civil proceeding.126 Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, the impact of a 
conviction on a noncitizen’s ability to remain in the country “was a central 
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 121. Id. at 1480 (emphasis added). 
 122. 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 
1994). 
 123. As enacted, the statute provided:  
That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such 
deportation be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing such alien for 
such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days 
thereafter, . . . make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such alien shall not be 
deported in pursuance of this Act. 
1917 Act, 39 Stat. 889–90 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994)). 
 124. Janvier, 793 F.2d at 452. 
 125. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479. 
 126. Janvier, 793 F.2d at 452; see also Castro, 26 F.3d 557. 
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issue to be resolved during the sentencing process—not merely a collateral 
matter outside the scope of counsel’s duty to provide effective represen-
tation.”127  The Padilla Court viewed this logic as a workable matrix, despite the 
historical fact that the JRAD did not apply to narcotics offenses after 1952128 
and was entirely eliminated in 1990.129  It also did not explain whether the fact 
that a civil consequence is automatic necessarily equates to its being an 
integral part of the criminal process.  But there is a difference between the two 
concepts.  Many consequences that are still deemed collateral are automatic.130  
This is a problem to which we will return. 
What is also fascinating is how a 1986 reading of the technical 
implications of a federal statutory system has now been transformed into a 
broad constitutional rule.  The key now, for constitutional purposes, is not the 
fact that Congress had intended state or federal judicial involvement in 
deportation per the JRAD, but quite the contrary.  It is that the system has 
rendered deportation a virtual inevitability in the absence of a JRAD option 
and the elimination of other forms of discretionary relief. 
4.! A More Formalistic Reading? 
Lest I be accused of an unduly expansive reading of Padilla, we must also 
recognize that the case could be read to cut in a different, much more formalist, 
direction.  It could be seen as a signal by the Court that Sixth Amendment 
norms should not be applied in deportation cases (outside of the criminal court 
context) at all.  To make this argument, one might note that the focus in Justice 
Stevens’s opinion on the automatic nature of the deportation sanction diverts 
attention from (indeed it may downplay) the harshness of deportation in its own 
right, whether linked to crime or not and whether automatic or not.131  Indeed, 
the Sixth Amendment model applied by the Padilla Court was rather strange 
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 127. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480. 
 128. The 1952 Act separately codified the moral turpitude offense provision and the narcotics 
offense provisions.  See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414-477, §§ 237, 241, 66 Stat. 
201, 204, 206 (1952).  Under the 1952 Act, the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation 
(JRAD) procedure applied only to the “provisions of subsection (a)(4),” the crimes-of-moral-turpitude 
provision.  Id. § 241, 66 Stat. at 208; see United States ex rel DeLuca v. O’Rourke, 213 F.2d 759 (8th 
Cir. 1954) (recognizing that, under the 1952 Act, narcotics offenses were no longer eligible for JRADs). 
 129. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050. 
 130. Contra Justice Breyer’s dissent in Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 186 (2001) (“There is, of 
course, an alternative.  We can, and should, define ‘offense’ in terms of the conduct that constitutes the 
crime that the offender committed on a particular occasion, including criminal acts that are ‘closely 
related to’ or ‘inextricably intertwined with’ the particular crime set forth in the charging instrument.”). 
 131. See discussion of Wong Wing, infra Part III. 
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when considered in this light.  The Court applied Strickland v. Washington132 in 
a way that depended not on the harshness of the deportation sanction, but 
primarily on its analytic complexity.  Thus, the nature of the requisite effective 
assistance of counsel now turns on whether the deportation sanction is 
automatic.  As to nonautomatic, nonintegral deportation consequences, the 
Padilla Court did not enunciate an especially demanding Sixth Amendment 
standard at all.  In the “numerous situations in which the deportation conse-
quences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain,” wrote Justice Stevens: 
The duty of the private practitioner . . . is more limited.  When the law 
is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need 
do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.133 
One obvious practical problem with this delineation, however, is that 
someone (presumably the criminal defense counsel) will have to distinguish the 
automatic cases from the uncertain ones.  Once this has been properly done, 
the attorney will necessarily have much more information to impart to the 
client.  It is not clear, however, whether the failure to share such information 
would justify the withdrawal of a guilty plea. 
One might also ask why Padilla was primarily structured as a case in the 
Sixth Amendment Strickland line rather than in the Fifth Amendment Boykin 
v. Alabama line that deals with the validity of the plea itself, not simply the role 
of counsel.134  If lawyers are obliged to advise clients about deportation, are 
courts now similarly obliged to make sure that the advice has been properly 
given?135  The logic in support of that conclusion seems rather strong, but it is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 132. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 133. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
 134. A criminal defendant entering a guilty plea must do so knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently.  Thus, the defendant must have “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of 
its consequence.”  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).  The general rule has long been, 
however, that “[t]he defendant need only understand the direct consequences of the plea; he need not 
be made aware every [sic] consequence that, absent a plea of guilty, would not otherwise occur.”  United 
States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 
266 (5th Cir. 1967)). 
 135. See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We have 
previously held that neither due process nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 require that a court 
advise a defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.” (citing United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 
354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Posner, 865 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that 
“[t]he failure to advise a defendant of collateral consequences of a plea of guilty does not render it 
involuntary”).  Under Banda, deportation was specifically named a collateral consequence.  See also 
United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 514–17 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the argument that 
changes in immigration laws affected the collateral nature of deportation such that judges must 
admonish defendants of the immigration consequences of a plea for that plea to be voluntary); El-
Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that deportation was collateral 
The Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment 1489 
!
!
clear that the Court majority did not want to go that far.  Also, although Padilla 
only addresses advice on immigration consequences in connection with guilty 
pleas, it calls into question cases that hold that immigration consequences are 
collateral and should not be considered at any point in a criminal proceeding.136 
To understand the scope of the Padilla opinion, it is perhaps useful to 
recall that Justice Stevens had long written passionately about his view of the 
role of the lawyer in the adversarial system.  As he wrote in dissent in 1986: 
This case turns on a proper appraisal of the role of the lawyer in our 
society.  If a lawyer is seen as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of 
wrongdoers—as in an inquisitorial society—then the Court’s decision 
today makes a good deal of sense.  If a lawyer is seen as an aid to the 
understanding and protection of constitutional rights—as in an accu-
satorial society—then today’s decision makes no sense at all.137 
He has also previously expressed his view of the important prophylactic 
role of strong and clear Sixth Amendment norms once adversary criminal 
proceedings have commenced.  In 1988, he wrote that “[g]iven the significance 
of the initiation of formal proceedings and the concomitant shift in the 
relationship between the state and the accused,” it was “quite wrong to suggest 
that Miranda warnings—or for that matter, any warnings offered by an adverse 
party—provide a sufficient basis for permitting . . . trained law enforcement 
personnel and prosecuting attorneys to communicate with as-of-yet unrepre-
sented criminal defendants.”138 
Moreover, Justice Stevens had also previously seen a rather broad array 
of concerns that might reasonably be considered as obligatory parts of the 
relationship between a criminal defense attorney and a defendant.  In 1991, 
he wrote: 
The scope of the relationship between an individual accused of crime 
and his attorney is as broad as the subject matter that might reasonably 
be encompassed by negotiations for a plea bargain or the contents of a 
presentence investigation report.  Any notion that a constitutional right 
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even in light of IIRIRA’s changes to immigration law); cf. United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188–
91 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 136. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Quispe, 744 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Mass. 2001) (ruling that immigra-
tion consequences are collateral and may not be a basis for a judge’s decision to dismiss criminal 
charges); Commonwealth v. Hason, 545 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that, but for the 
Massachusetts immigration warnings statute, a trial judge would have no duty to warn of immigration 
consequences because they are collateral); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 407 (2010) (concluding 
that a general warning by a court does not cure counsel’s ineffective representation and does not 
overcome prejudice). 
 137. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 468 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 138. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 306–07 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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to counsel is, or should be, narrowly defined by the elements of a pending 
charge is both unrealistic and invidious.139 
In any event, it seems rather strained to read such logical gaps and 
inconsistencies as indicative of a revitalization of the bright-line dichotomy 
against which the balance of the opinion pushes so strenuously.  The better 
reading of the opinion, taken as a whole, is that such inconsistencies were the 
price that Justice Stevens had to pay to steer between the Scylla of a fully 
functionalist holding about deportation (which would have implied a right to 
deportation counsel in civil deportation proceedings and to a full colloquy 
about deportation) and the Charybdis of the direct/collateral formalism (which 
would have sustained the Kentucky Supreme Court).  The reasoning of Padilla 
is thus somewhat similar to the Court’s methodology in INS v. St. Cyr in which 
Justice Stevens (who also wrote the majority opinion in that case) first affirmed 
that “deportation is not punishment for past crimes,” but then imported an 
anti-retroactivity norm redolent of constitutional criminal law into the nomi-
nally civil deportation realm.140  In both cases the civil–criminal line and the 
definition of deportation as nonpunitive are maintained even as their recognized 
harsh consequences are overcome through other means.141  The result is a bit of 
a mixed message, constitutionally speaking, but one that holds real promise for 
future development. 
B.! The Concurrence 
The strong version of Padilla—that went beyond affirmative misadvice—
was in major part a 5–4 decision.  Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
endorsed the proposition that an attorney fails to provide effective assistance 
under Strickland by misleading “a noncitizen client regarding the removal 
consequences of a conviction.”142  They did this despite referring to the Court’s 
decision as “a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law.”143  The nub of their 
argument seems to have been that “incompetent advice distorts the defendant’s 
decisionmaking process and seems to call the fairness and integrity of the 
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 139. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 187 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 140. See Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere: The Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 421 (2002). 
 141. Padilla, however, goes farther than St. Cyr in one critical respect: It frames the deportation 
issue within the constitutional norms of the Sixth Amendment, thus creating the Fifth-and-a-Half 
Amendment (Amendment V½).  The St. Cyr Court did not do this with the ex post facto clause, 
though there were (and there still are) powerful arguments in support of doing so.  Id. 
 142. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. at 1491. 
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criminal proceeding itself into question.”144 As the Court had done in Strickland 
itself, the goal of ensuring a fair trial was seen to undergird the requirement of 
effective assistance of counsel.145  As noted above, this is a blend of Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment concerns.  Indeed, the concurring Justices’ focus on due 
process supports my thesis that—taken as a whole—Padilla implies a new norm. 
Apart from the duty not to “unreasonably”146 provide incorrect advice, 
however, the maximum Strickland duty seen by Justices Alito and Roberts was 
to “advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immi-
gration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien 
should consult an immigration attorney.”147 
They did not agree with the majority “that the attorney must attempt to 
explain what those consequences may be.”148  This was mostly due to the com-
plexity of immigration law.  As the concurring Justices noted, “Incomplete 
legal advice [by criminal defense lawyers who are not experts in immigration 
law] may be worse than no advice at all because it may mislead and may 
dissuade the client from seeking advice from a more knowledgeable source.”149  
This is a proposition with which I agree.  But, rather than simply resting on a 
lesser Strickland burden, I suggest that this further supports a right to 
deportation counsel. 
Justices Alito and Roberts also worried that “the Court’s rigid 
constitutional rule could inadvertently head off more promising ways of 
addressing the underlying problem—such as statutory or administrative reforms 
requiring trial judges to inform a defendant on the record that a guilty plea may 
carry adverse immigration consequences.”150 They noted that twenty-eight states 
and the District of Columbia had already “adopted rules, plea forms, or statutes 
requiring courts to advise criminal defendants of the possible immigration 
consequences of their pleas.”151  Although they only expressly endorsed this as a 
subconstitutional model (and neither would likely endorse it as a constitutional 
requirement), it seems potentially to express a nascent due process requirement 
as well. 
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 144. Id. at 1493 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“In giving meaning 
to the requirement [of effective assistance of counsel], we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair 
trial—as the guide.”)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. It is not clear to me how one could “reasonably” provide incorrect legal advice. 
 147. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1491. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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C.! The Dissent 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.  Beginning with an 
implicit nod to Voltaire, the dissenters asserted that “in the best of all possible 
worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be advised 
of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to be 
misadvised.”152  Their concern was that the Constitution “is not an all-purpose 
tool for judicial construction of a perfect world.”153  The Court, they suggested, 
swung “a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.”154 
In evaluating this dissent one should note at the outset that Justice Scalia 
is skeptical of the validity of not only the majority opinion in Padilla, but also of 
Strickland and, for that matter, of Gideon v. Wainwright155 itself.  Writing in a 
mode that can perhaps best be described as strongly polemical and iconoclas-
tic, if not downright curmudgeonly, Justice Scalia wrote that “Even assuming 
the validity of these holdings, [Gideon and Strickland], I reject the significant 
further extension that the Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence, 
would create.”156 
Adopting a rather formalistic and certainly a tightly circumscribed view of 
the Sixth Amendment, the dissenters asserted that there is “no basis in text or 
in principle to extend the constitutionally required advice regarding guilty 
pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at hand . . . .”157  
These were then narrowly defined as “the sentence that the plea will produce, 
the higher sentence that conviction after trial might entail, and the chances 
of such a conviction.”158  In support of this narrow reading, they noted that, not 
only had the Court never before extended the Sixth Amendment to “conse-
quences collateral to prosecution,” but “we have not even required counsel 
appointed to defend against one prosecution to be present when the defendant 
is interrogated in connection with another possible prosecution arising from 
the same event.”159 
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 152. Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 156. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. at 1495. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. (citing Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001)); cf. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 186–87 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“There is, of course, an alternative.  We can, and should, define ‘offense’ in terms of the 
conduct that constitutes the crime that the offender committed on a particular occasion, including 
criminal acts that are ‘closely related to’ or ‘inextricably intertwined with’ the particular crime set forth 
in the charging instrument . . . . One cannot say in favor of this commonly followed approach that it is 
perfectly clear—only that, because it comports with common sense, it is far easier to apply than that of 
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A major concern for the dissenters was that the majority’s extension of 
counsel’s duties to include “an obligation to advise about a conviction’s colla-
teral consequences has no logical stopping-point.”160 Even the misadvice 
limitation, they felt, was insufficient to avoid “[t]he same indeterminacy, the 
same inability to know what areas of advice are relevant. . . .”161 
Finally, Justice Scalia noted that the concurrence’s treatment of misadvice 
seemed driven largely by concern about the voluntariness of Padilla’s guilty 
plea.  One might also have found this implicit in the majority opinion.  That 
concern, the dissenters argued, more properly relates to the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than the Sixth 
Amendment, a proposition with which I tend to agree, at least partly.162  Of 
course, they did not suggest that the Due Process Clause would provide relief.  
Indeed, such a rule would be broader than the majority holding and would 
require every judge to refine each plea colloquy to ensure that the defendant 
actually understood all the deportation risks.  Under current law, the general 
rule is that mere awareness of direct consequences suffices for the validity of a 
guilty plea.163  There is an extensive and contradictory body of case law 
applying the direct/collateral distinction in this context.164  The required 
colloquy between a federal district court and a defendant required by Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) (formerly Rule 11(c)), which has been said 
to approximate the due process requirements for a valid plea, does not mention 
collateral consequences.165  Thus, the dissenters’ nod to the Fifth Amendment 
was perhaps a bit disingenuous.  It does, however, appropriately focus our 
attention on the real problem for the Padilla majority: reconciling Fifth and 
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the majority.  One might add that, unlike the majority’s test, it is consistent with this Court’s 
assumptions in previous cases.  And, most importantly, the ‘closely related’ test furthers, rather than 
undermines, the Sixth Amendment’s ‘right to counsel,’ a right so necessary to the realization in practice 
of that most ‘noble ideal,’ a fair trial.” (citations omitted)). 
 160. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1496 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
 163. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. 
 164. See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that a defendant need 
not be informed that a committal for life as a sexually dangerous person was possible as a result of a 
guilty plea); cf. United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
permanent ineligibility for federal benefits was a direct consequence of a guilty plea that must be 
disclosed to the defendant by the court).  In United States v. Amador-Leal, immigration consequences 
were deemed collateral under this rubric.  United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 
2002).  See generally Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to Know the 
Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47 (2010). 
 165. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49–50 (1995). 
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Sixth Amendment jurisprudence regarding criminal pleas in the context of 
deportation consequences. 
IV.! PONDERING AMENDMENT V½ AFTER PADILLA 
A.! Amendment VI: Apparent Simplicity and Real Complexity 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”166  Though its language seems simple and direct, the full meaning is 
far from self-evident.  Consider, for example, just a few threshold questions: 
•! What is the meaning of the phrase “criminal prosecu-
tions”?  Does it only apply to those instances in which the 
government calls the process a criminal one?  Or should 
it extend to cases that impose sanctions similar or ana-
logous to historical criminal sanctions even if the gov-
ernment chooses to label the process itself civil? 
•! How far does the right to “assistance” for “defence” 
extend?  Must the government pay for a lawyer?  If so, 
must it also pay for a lawyer at sentencing?  Appeals?  Colla-
teral challenges? 
•! Does the right to assistance imply a right to retrospective 
consideration of whether such assistance was effective? 
And so on.  My purpose here is not to answer these questions; indeed each 
one has a long and complex history.  Moreover, the Sixth Amendment was 
never seen as the only possible basis upon which a person could claim a right to 
appointed counsel.  Common law courts had “inherent power to entertain 
gratuitously the plaints of the needy” in both civil and criminal cases.167  And, 
as is discussed further below, the Court has occasionally seen fit to derive a 
right to counsel from due process norms.168 
In the modern era, the Court has also sometimes extended Sixth 
Amendment norms beyond the “in-court” aspects of the criminal process.  In 
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 166. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 167. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 365–66 (1923) 
(citing Rex v. Wright, 2 Stra. 1041 (1735), more fully reported in Cas. K. B. temp. Hardw. 200, 240 
(referring to a criminal proceeding in which it was said that “as the prosecutor could have no costs[,] the 
defendant might be admitted in forma pauperis”)). 
 168. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33–34, 41, 55–56 (1967) (holding that juveniles accused of 
crimes in a delinquency proceeding must—under the Fourteenth Amendment—be afforded certain due 
process rights, including the right to timely notification of charges, the right to confront witnesses, the 
right against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel). 
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Massiah v. United States,169 for example, an indicted defendant was engaged in 
conversation by an acquaintance who was serving as a “wired” prosecution 
informer.  The Court viewed this as an interrogation and ruled that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel precluded questioning of an indicted defendant 
under any circumstances without defense counsel present.170  Decades later, in 
Fellers v. United States, the Court held that interviewing an indicted defendant 
at home without the presence of counsel or waiver of counsel violated the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.171 
Such cases inevitably involve a long-running pas de deux between Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment norms.  In Escobedo v. Illinois,172 the Court held that 
police had violated the Sixth Amendment by denying an arrested suspect the 
opportunity to consult with his retained counsel.173  The Court, in a pre-Miranda 
formulation, found that such a suspect’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated 
if he has requested and has been denied an opportunity to consult with his 
lawyer, “and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute consti-
tutional right to remain silent . . . .”174  To implement this rule, the Court also 
adopted an exclusionary rule: “[N]o statement elicited by the police during the 
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.”175  As Charles 
Weisselberg has noted, Escobedo—particularly when read in the light of 
Gideon—raised a welter of questions not dissimilar from those raised by Padilla: 
Danny Escobedo had a retained attorney, but what about an indigent 
suspect who could not afford to hire a lawyer?  When did these Sixth 
Amendment rights inhere?  What did it mean for an investigation to 
“focus” on a suspect?176 
The Court soon resolved some such questions by relying not on the Sixth 
Amendment, but on the Fifth, in Miranda.177  In this sense, “Escobedo set the 
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 169. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 170. The ruling was limited to the specific situation in which the police have focused their 
investigation on a particular suspect in custody.  Id. at 206–07.  In Brewer v. Williams, the Court 
confirmed that interrogation of one who has been formally charged and is represented by counsel 
violates the Sixth Amendment.  Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400–01 (1977). 
 171. 540 U.S. 519, 524–25 (2004). 
 172. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 173. Id. at 490–91. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 491. 
 176. Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 116–17 (1998). 
 177. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  In Miranda, the Court held that the prosecution 
may not use statements derived from a custodial interrogation of a suspect unless it can demonstrate 
the use of procedural safeguards effective in securing the privilege against self-incrimination.  
Although the Fifth Amendment protects only the right against self-incrimination and does not 
specifically discuss the right to counsel, Miranda held that the right to have an attorney present during 
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 
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stage for Miranda.”178  The ostensibly more focused Sixth Amendment rea-
soning of Escobedo was largely subsumed.179  Indeed, the Court, in retrospect, 
has seen the prime purpose of Escobedo as not to vindicate the constitutional 
right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, “to guarantee full effectuation of 
the privilege against self-incrimination . . . .”180 
One could similarly view the Padilla problem as a temporal one: When 
does the criminal process end?  Or more substantively: What sanctions are 
part of the criminal process for Sixth Amendment purposes?  A related 
question was considered by the Court in United States v. Gouveia.181  The defen-
dants in Gouveia were prison inmates, suspected of murder, who had been 
placed in an administrative detention unit and denied counsel until an 
indictment was filed.  Although no formal judicial proceedings had taken place 
prior to the indictment, the defendants argued that their administrative 
detention should be treated as an accusation for purposes of the right to counsel 
because the government was actively investigating the crimes.  The Court 
recognized that “because an inmate suspected of a crime is already in prison, 
the prosecution may have little incentive promptly to bring formal charges 
against him, and that the resulting preindictment delay may be particularly 
prejudicial to the inmate. . . .”182  But the conclusion was, in effect, the opposite 
of that reached in Padilla.  The Court noted that statutes of limitation and Fifth 
Amendment protections guarded against delay and that there was no basis for 
“depart[ing] from our traditional interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel in order to provide additional protections for [the inmates].”183 
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self-incrimination.  Miranda has been recognized as a constitutional decision.  Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (“We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may 
not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.”).  The 
Court, however, has limited Miranda’s protective scope in various ways.  See, e.g., Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (holding that, unless and until a suspect actually states that he is 
relying on his Miranda right, subsequent voluntary statements can be used in court and police can 
continue to interact with (or question) him).  The Berghuis Court ruled that the mere act of remaining 
silent was, on its own, insufficient to imply that the suspect has invoked his rights and that a 
voluntary reply even after lengthy silence could be construed as implying a waiver.  Id. at 2260–63.  In 
her dissent, Justice Sotomayor described the majority opinion as “a substantial retreat from the 
protection against compelled self-incrimination that Miranda v. Arizona has long provided during 
custodial interrogation.”  Id. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 178. Weisselberg, supra note 176, at 117. 
 179. Escobedo, in general, “is not to be broadly extended beyond the facts of that particular case.”  
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Frazier 
v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733–34 (1966)). 
 180. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 729. 
 181. 467 U.S. 180 (1984). 
 182. Id. at 192. 
 183. Id. 
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On the other hand, as Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, confirmed in 
2006, it is a mistake to subsume the Sixth Amendment too completely 
within the broad parameters of due process.184  In a case in which the defen-
dant had been denied his counsel of choice, Justice Scalia concluded that “the 
Government’s argument in effect reads the Sixth Amendment as a more 
detailed version of the Due Process Clause—and then proceeds to give no 
effect to the details.”185 While it is true enough, he continued, “that the purpose 
of the rights set forth in that Amendment is to ensure a fair trial,” it does not 
follow that “the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, 
fair.”186  The right at stake was the right to counsel of choice, not the right to 
a fair trial; “and that right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was 
erroneous.  No additional showing of prejudice is required to make the 
violation ‘complete.’”187 
Padilla’s application of Sixth Amendment norms to deportation may be 
fruitfully compared to the evolution of due process ideas applied to state court 
criminal proceedings, through the Fourteenth Amendment, culminating in 
Gideon.188  One sees general, multifactored due process reasoning evolving into 
the purported specificity of a Sixth Amendment rule.  For example, in the 
foundational case of Powell v. Alabama,189 the Court noted that “under the circums-
tances just stated, the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the 
failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was . . . a 
denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”190  
What were those circumstances?  As is well known, the Powell case involved a 
group of African American youths who had been charged with the rape of two 
white girls—a capital offense—in Alabama.191  The Court noted “the ignorance 
and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public 
hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the 
military forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in other states 
and communication with them necessarily difficult, and above all that they 
stood in deadly peril of their lives . . . .”192  Though the analogy might be 
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 184. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 185. Id. at 145. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 145–46. 
 188. See William Haney, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARV. INT’L L.J. 177, 180–
82 (1970). 
 189. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 190. Id. at 71 (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. at 49–50. 
 192. Id. at 71. 
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somewhat strained in some cases, one might make similar arguments about 
deportees, especially refugees.193 
At first, the Court made it quite clear that Powell was not to be read as a 
wholesale importation of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth: “Whether 
this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, 
we need not determine.”194  For years, the model was the fundamental fairness 
approach of Betts v. Brady, in which the Court had held that, in cases decided 
by state courts: 
Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the 
totality of facts in a given case.  That which may, in one setting, 
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal 
sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other 
considerations, fall short of such denial.195 
Betts had seen due process as “a concept less rigid and more fluid than those 
envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.”196  
Thus, Betts had held that the refusal to appoint counsel under the particular facts 
and circumstances presented was not so “offensive to the common and fundamen-
tal ideas of fairness” as to amount to a denial of due process.197  That model was 
subjected to withering criticism (and an ever-increasing number of exceptions) 
for some two decades before the Court finally rejected it in Gideon, one of the 
most iconic and widely cited cases in U.S. history.  Thus, the right to counsel 
in most kinds of criminal cases is now categorically fundamental and essential 
to a fair trial and obligatory upon the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.198  As Justice Black put it in Gideon: 
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor 
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him.  This seems to us to be an obvious truth.199 
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 193. Echoing Michael Klarman’s appraisal of Powell, one might view Padilla v. Kentucky as a case 
that also “sheds light on . . . the capacity of the Supreme Court to compel social change.”  Michael J. 
Klarman, Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379, 379–80 (2009). 
 194. Id.; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340–42 (1963) (applying the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in state criminal cases); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1942) 
(establishing a case-by-case model for state cases); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1937) (noting 
that counsel must be provided to the indigent in federal criminal cases). 
 195. Betts, 316 U.S. at 462. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added) (citing Betts, 316 U.S. at 473). 
 198. Id. at 340–41 (“We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.”). 
 199. Id. at 344.  Justice Black continued: 
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So is Padilla a Gideon decision for deportees?200  Not quite.  Indeed, as 
noted, the Padilla Court focused a great deal on the purportedly automatic 
nature of a particular type of deportation sanction in order to connect it to the 
criminal process and, in turn, to justify the invocation of the Sixth Amendment 
to it.201 This approach raises at least as many questions as it answers. For 
instance, why should it matter for Sixth Amendment purposes whether or not 
the risk of deportation is automatic?  Many so-called collateral consequences of 
criminal convictions could fairly be called automatic.  Are they all therefore 
now direct consequences for Sixth Amendment purposes?  Plainly, the answer 
to that is no.  Thus, it is not only the automatic aspect that counts—our 
analysis must also involve the substance of the sanction.  But then, of course, 
we must face a dilemma from the other side: If automatic deportation counts as 
part of the criminal process for right-to-counsel purposes, why doesn’t it also 
count as double-jeopardy, at least in deportations that arise from federal 
criminal prosecutions?  Again, the best reconciliation depends upon a norm 
that straddles Amendments V and VI. 
Even if Padilla is not quite Gideon-redux, the recognition of Amendment 
V½ begins to breach the formalistic civil/criminal divide in deportation cases.  
This approach conforms to the rule that what is at issue is “not merely the 
‘weight’ of the individual’s interest, but whether the nature of the interest is 
one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”202 Due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.”203  It would seem to be clearly 
wrong now to categorize all forms of deportation as noncriminal, nonpunitive, 
and collateral, and thus subject only to flexible (and frequently ineffective) due 
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Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish 
machinery to try defendants accused of crime.  Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed 
essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly society.  Similarly, there are few 
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to 
prepare and present their defenses. 
Id. 
 200. See Maria Teresa Rojas, A “Gideon Decision” for Immigrants, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. BLOG 
(Apr. 7, 2010), http://blog.soros.org/2010/04/a-gideon-for-immigrants. 
 201. The Sixth Amendment norms now will apply directly to such deportation consequences 
whether they arise in federal or in state criminal prosecutions. 
 202. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (emphasis added) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67 (1972)); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–90 (1973) (emphasis added).  
Gagnon held that part of the process due in parole or probation revocation proceedings might be the 
appointment of counsel, but this was to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Id. 
 203. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. 
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process norms à la Betts.204  A harder look is now required, if not in all depor-
tation cases, then certainly in the post-entry social control type in which 
deportation is based on a criminal conviction. 
B.! Amendment V: The Civil Nature of Deportation and the Due 
Process Model 
In civil litigation, some equalizing measures for the “poor, 
friendless . . . stranger”205 have long been a feature of the Anglo-Saxon and 
American legal traditions.206 Indeed, such protections go back millennia, to 
Roman law and to the reign of Henry I of England.207  Such egalitarian ideas 
were sometimes included in early constitutions.  The 1780 Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights—part of “the oldest written Constitution still in use 
in the world today”208—provided that every subject “ought to obtain right 
and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and 
without any denial; promptly, and without delay . . . .”209 Indeed, early 
treatises on constitutional law had noted that the right to counsel in civil 
cases and upon charges of misdemeanors antedated such a right in cases of 
felony and treason.210 And the “presence, advice, and assistance of counsel” was 
generally seen as necessarily included in the requirements of “due process of 
law.”211 Still, as one commentator wrote in 1923, not only had the common law 
made little progress by the twentieth century regarding ideas of equal access, 
but there had been retrogression: 
Poverty, often through the application of some rule of law which 
otherwise seems eminently reasonable, blocks a civil litigant’s path at 
every stage of the proceedings.  A penniless suitor may . . . get into court, 
but be helpless because he cannot pay for a lawyer . . . .212 
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 204. This historical approach, as noted, involved a case-by-case method redolent of Betts v. Brady, 
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appointed counsel. 
 205. Maguire, supra note 167, at 361. 
 206. Id. (citing The Mirror of Justices, 7 SELDEN SOC’Y 14 (1893)). 
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CONST. pt. 1, art. XI. 
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 212. Maguire, supra note 167, at 362. 
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This inadequate help for the poor was especially problematic for 
deportees.  In fact, at the start of the twentieth century, it was unclear 
whether deportation proceedings required due process of law at all.  In the 1903 
case of Yamataya v. Fisher,213 the Court, albeit obliquely, stated that it had 
“never held . . . that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a 
statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental 
principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution.”214 In Yamataya, Justice Harlan thus made 
relatively clear—at least as to an “alien, who has entered the country, and has 
become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its 
population”—that administrative process must comply with certain due 
process norms.215  It could not be “arbitrary” and the “alien” must, at a 
minimum, be given an opportunity to be heard.  Over time, as noted above, this 
standard developed into a flexible—if rather deferential—due process 
touchstone of fundamental fairness.216 
By long describing deportation as civil, however, the Supreme Court had 
effectively ruled out any Sixth Amendment claims of a constitutional right to 
counsel. In 1961, Charles Gordon accurately noted the state of the law regarding 
the constitutional status of deportation: “[T]he courts thus far have resisted 
every effort to assimilate deportation to criminal punishment and to apply the 
constitutional guarantees and procedures that relate to criminal prosecu-
tions.”217 As William Haney noted in 1970, strong arguments could be made 
against this formalism, based on the fact that “[m]any of the same consid-
erations concerning the role of counsel that govern in criminal proceedings 
are also relevant to deportation proceedings.”218  These included the fact that 
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 213. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 214. Id. at 100. 
 215. Id. at 100–01. 
 216. The Yamataya Court used what in modern terms we would call a clear statement 
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did not conflict with the Constitution’s prohibition of “ex post facto enactments”); Carlson v. Landon, 
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“deportation proceedings are adversary proceedings in which a lawyer’s skill 
may well prove decisive,” in which the respondents are likely to be not only 
poor but also often “ignorant of our institutions and unfamiliar with the English 
language. . . .”219  Still, essentially until Padilla, one could have framed the issue 
in dichotomous terms: The question of a right to counsel in deportation 
proceedings, as Gordon noted, “must take into account the currently accepted 
view that the immigration process is civil and administrative, not criminal and 
judicial.”220  But it also implicates “the growing awareness of the vital interests 
involved and of the need for assuring the fullest protection of basic human 
rights.”221  Formal categories, in short, have long been in some tension with 
vital interests and human rights in deportation cases. 
The black-letter consequence of this dichotomy was the inapplicability of 
the Sixth Amendment and an evolving—but dull-edged—notion of the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.222  Essentially, procedural due process 
has meant, very generally, fairness and an opportunity to be heard.  The idea of 
a constitutional right to appointed counsel was rarely mentioned in early 
deportation cases applying then-current notions of fairness.  This is, of course, 
not surprising in that such a federal right had not even begun to be generally 
recognized in state criminal cases until the 1930s.  However, it has long been 
clear that the right to have counsel (at least if one could hire a lawyer) “was 
evaluated as an aspect in the total picture of fair dealing.”223  In one 1915 immi-
gration case, for example, the judge noted at the outset that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel related only to criminal prosecutions.  He then 
went on to hold that “it is equally true that that provision was inserted in the 
Constitution because the assistance of counsel was recognized as essential to any 
fair trial of a case against a prisoner.”224  Thus, in an early legal realist mode, the 
court concluded that, “[t]o make the defendant’s substantial rights in a matter 
involving personal liberty depend on whether the proceeding be called ‘crim-
inal’ or ‘civil’ seems to me unsound.”225  Charles Gordon noted in 1961, as had 
others before him, that aliens represented by counsel had a much better chance 
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 220. Gordon, supra note 217, at 876. 
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of success than the unrepresented.226  In this vein, most scholarship,227 cases,228 
and much litigation strategy have tended to focus more on the Fifth than on 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in deportation matters. 
The most well-known such case is that of the Sixth Circuit in Aguilera-
Enriquez v. INS.229  Modeling its reasoning on the probation-revocation case of 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli230 and on the parole-revocation hearing norms developed 
in Morrissey v. Brewer,231 the Sixth Circuit adopted a case-by-case, retrospective 
due process approach to determine if appointed counsel was required.  As the 
Aguilera-Enriquez court put it: 
[T]he test for whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for 
an indigent alien is whether, in a given case, the assistance of counsel 
would be necessary to provide “fundamental fairness, the touchstone of 
due process.”232 
It turns out, however, that fundamental fairness of this variant virtually 
never seems to require counsel.  As one commentator noted more than a decade 
ago, “In practice, the case-by-case approach has essentially resulted in across-
the-board denials of appointed counsel.”233  This has remained true due to the 
very high burden that is placed on deportees.  A typical formulation is found in 
a 2007 Sixth Circuit case: 
In order to establish a due process violation, Mossaad must show that his 
lack of counsel at his removal hearing rose to the level of a constitu-
tional defect, and that had he been represented by counsel he would not 
have been ordered removed.234 
A 2006 case reasoned similarly: “[Petitioner] must establish that, but for 
the ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have been entitled to continue 
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residing in the United States.”235  The basic doctrinal reason for this, as noted, 
was the Supreme Court’s historical reluctance to revisit the civil/criminal 
formalism that has long governed deportation proceedings.236 
C.! Amendment V½ 
“One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: ‘Let them have the most 
illustrious counsel, now.  They can’t escape the noose.  There is nothing that 
counsel can do for them at the trial.’”237 
1.! Does Amendment V½ Make Sense? 
To understand how Padilla implies Amendment V½  and to construe it in 
its best light, we should note an obvious but perhaps still subtle point: The 
majority opinion is not really focused on the criminal process or the criminal 
sanction at all.  Rather, the criminal process is simply the envelope within 
which the potential deportation sanction happens to be packaged.  A simple 
hypothetical might help make my point: Imagine a noncitizen, a long-term 
legal permanent resident who is facing a relatively minor criminal charge (for 
example, simple drug possession with a maximum sentence of, say, six months).  
He is advised by his criminal lawyer to take a plea and he is sentenced to 
probation.  But the drug conviction leads to a very harsh deportation against 
which he has no defense.  He would be separated from a large U.S. family and 
sent to a very poor country where he knows no one and does not speak the 
language.  Presumably, if he had been misadvised by his criminal defense lawyer 
about the deportation consequence, he might now have a viable claim to 
withdraw the plea under Padilla.  But is the most salient aspect of this vignette 
really the fact that it happened to arise in the criminal context?  “Well okay,” 
you may say, “but this problem is not unique to deportation.  We all know that 
some civil sanctions may be more onerous than criminal ones.  But the Sixth 
Amendment is what it is.  So it is only in the criminal context that one has any 
clear constitutional right to counsel.”  This is surely a valid point; but I am not 
sure that it is sufficient, particularly if we recall the deep relationship between 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.   
Consider a slight variation on the previous facts: What if the defendant 
had waived counsel in the criminal case and—correctly recognizing the relative 
seriousness of his two problems—had hired immigration counsel instead to 
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represent him in deportation proceedings and also to advise him as he 
proceeded pro se in criminal court? What if that specialist, in turn, had provided 
the exact same incorrect advice offered by Padilla’s criminal lawyer? Again, the 
noncitizen has now seen the tragic error and he moves to withdraw his plea.  
Read narrowly, Padilla might seem to offer no support for the latter claim.  But 
its underlying normative basis and its logic seem to provide a way through.  
Justice Stevens’s opinion evokes not only our better expectations of lawyers, 
but it also recognizes the potential severity of deportation and, perhaps, the 
desire to ensure informed, genuine voluntariness in pleas. In light of that, Padilla 
and Amendment V½ reasoning seem equally supportive of a constitutional 
right to effective counsel in both cases and, perhaps, a constitutional right to a 
full colloquy regarding deportation in the criminal court. 
But, if you are with me so far, why stop here?  If the deportation sanction 
is sufficiently connected to—or analogous to—the criminal sanction to justify 
the imposition of Sixth Amendment norms to it in criminal courts, doesn’t this 
also imply a right to counsel in immigration court?  Among the most interesting 
and important post-Padilla tasks for advocates and courts will thus be to 
determine the extent to which Amendment V½ fortifies recognized Fifth 
Amendment protections in deportation proceedings.  We must also ask 
whether Amendment V½ norms should be applied differently in different types 
of deportation cases.238  And how, if at all, should Padilla inform our approach to 
postdeportation cases?239 
Before we move to these questions, let me concede that I fully realize that 
some might reasonably find my Amendment V½ reading of Padilla to be—
unlike the quality of mercy—a bit strained.240  But, as discussed above, the 
strain is mostly due to the formalist background that the majority opinion 
struggles to avoid transcending. Further, the contrary reading is no less strained.  
Does it make better sense to derive a right to counsel in large part from a 
recognition of the harshness of a sanction and then say to a defendant whose 
case is complex that his criminal lawyer’s duty is limited because his ultimate 
fate will be decided in a proceeding in which he has no right to counsel? 
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 238. I do not mean to suggest that other sorts of deportations of undocumented people do not also 
raise powerful normative and legal concerns.  But the post-entry social control variety seems the easiest 
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WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, at 180–87. 
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Of course, deportation law has faced this dilemma before.  Consider the 
1896 case of Wong Wing v. United States.241 The Court confronted an 1892 
deportation statute that also authorized the imprisonment at hard labor for up 
to a year of any Chinese person judged to be in the United States illegally.242  
The statute provided that such defendants would have no right to indictment 
or judicial trial before an Article III judge.  The essential idea seems to have 
been that Chinese noncitizens were a completely different class of people for 
constitutional purposes (the law, it should be noted, only applied to a “Chinese 
person or person of Chinese descent”243).  Indeed, they were sometimes analo-
gized to property.  As one Senator put it, “we have the right to make precisely 
the same laws, establish the same rules and regulations in respect to the 
immigration of foreigners that we have in respect to the importation of foreign 
manufactured goods, and we do not put them under our criminal laws.”244 
The Court found the hard labor provision unconstitutional, but not on 
the due process/equal protection grounds that immediately strike the modern 
observer as most applicable.  Rather, the Court struggled with the civil/criminal 
distinction.  Although detention or temporary confinement was held a permiss-
ible part “of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the 
exclusion or expulsion of aliens”245 when Congress implemented deportation 
policy with “infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their 
property,” “such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to 
establish the guilt of the accused.”246 
The distinction between detention that is merely “part of the means 
necessary” to facilitate deportation and that which would be part of “infamous 
punishment” is not so clear in practice as it seems in theory.  For one thing, the 
two systems are now merged to a great degree and criminal prisoners often find 
themselves subject to immigration detainers that can prolong their confinement 
or impede their ability to access work release transfers and the like.  Moreover, 
immigration detention may, in certain cases, continue for very long periods of 
time, and it often takes place in the very same facilities where criminal 
prisoners are held.  Thus, the distinction between the two forms of incarcera-
tion may depend for the most part on the intention of the government. 
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In any event, Wong Wing’s lawyers apparently did not argue, as they 
might have, that the deportation proceedings themselves were in their nature 
criminal247 or quasi-criminal.248  Such arguments might have convinced the 
Court to undertake a more serious due process analysis.  But their line of 
argument accepted the civil/criminal distinction.  Since the potential one 
year at hard labor was clearly criminal punishment, they contended, it 
therefore demanded all relevant constitutional protections.249  The Court was 
thus spared the task of revisiting the constitutional status of deportation itself. 
One can easily understand why Wong Wing’s lawyers chose the more 
direct path to victory.  Deportation had just recently been deemed a civil 
proceeding (and therefore not punishment for constitutional purposes) by the 
Court in its 1892 decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.250  Though Fong 
Yue Ting had inspired passionate dissents, its holding was not ambiguous on this 
point.  As one federal judge noted in an 1893 opinion that considered the same 
provision at issue in Wong Wing, it was by then clear that the “expulsion 
from this country of a foreigner who came into it contrary to its laws, and who 
was thereby excluded, is not subjecting him to prosecution or punishment for 
crime . . . .”251  The implication of this, he continued, was 
that the constitutional, statutory, and common law provisions and rules 
in respect to criminal prosecutions have no application to the mere 
expulsion or deportation of such Chinese persons as came here contrary 
to and in violation of the laws of the United States.252 
The Supreme Court reasoned similarly in Wong Wing, which actually had 
begun in 1892 but was not decided until 1896.253  The Court reaffirmed that the 
government’s extra-constitutional plenary power to exclude noncitizens 
extended to deportations from U.S. territory.  Indeed, the opinion went so far 
as to say that courts could put no limits upon the power of Congress “to protect, 
by summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or 
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habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if they have already 
found their way into our land and unlawfully remain therein.”254 
But if that were really so, then the case should have ended right there, and 
it did not.  Clearly, the “no limits” phrasing seems to have been meant—for 
lack of a better term—in a limited sense.  Thus, the Wong Wing Court, in addi-
tion to its plenary power discourse, also saw the constitutional civil/criminal line 
as applicable to deportees.  The Court sought what it termed a “theory of our 
government”255 that distinguished the civil mechanisms of deportation from 
criminal punishment. The year at hard labor could not be insulated from consti-
tutional scrutiny simply because Congress had placed the sanction within the 
deportation system.  Neither the formalistic plenary power doctrine nor the sta-
tus of the accused as Chinese “deportable aliens” could override the fact that 
the sanction itself was clearly criminal punishment.  As the Court reasoned, it 
is apparently one thing to deport people with minimal, if any, process, even 
with racist laws.  But once the government chooses “to declare unlawful resi-
dence within the country to be an infamous crime, punishable by deprivation 
of liberty and property,”256 then a different constitutional rule is involved.  Such 
lawmaking “would . . . pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless 
provision were made that the fact of guilt should first be established by a 
judicial trial.”257 
Essentially, Wong Wing raised the same question that has been re-visited 
by Padilla v. Kentucky:258 How should courts draw the line between what we 
might call regulatory civil deportation procedures and punitive deportation-
related enforcement mechanisms that require constitutional protections similar 
to those which criminal defendants are due?259  There are many ways to answer 
this question in addition to Amendment V½: One can use the traditional lens 
of due process, the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, equal protec-
tion, etc.  One way not to answer the question properly, however, is to focus 
excessively on the possible availability of discretionary relief in immigration 
court.  For one thing, our understanding of discretion in deportation law is itself 
a complicated problem.260  Also, its availability has been drastically reduced and 
many of its forms are not subject to judicial review.  As we have seen, the 
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likelihood of success without counsel is much less than for those who are 
represented.  All of this indicates that we should understand the deportation 
process as a whole and not seek to separate out the part that happens to be 
nested within the criminal process. 
2.! Does Amendment V½ Make a Difference? 
We can now get to the nub of the matter.  Could Amendment V½ really 
matter?  As noted, Amendment V½ analysis bridges the divide between 
modern Sixth Amendment criminal right-to-counsel cases such as Gideon v. 
Wainwright261 and its progeny, and Fifth Amendment due process cases 
governing administrative deportation proceedings.  Right-to-counsel claims, as 
noted, have not fared well in the existing system.  Though lack of counsel (and 
ineffective assistance of counsel) in deportation proceedings have long been 
recognized as problems, courts have very rarely seen either as a due process 
violation.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 did provide that a 
noncitizen in deportation proceedings had at least a right to an attorney “at no 
expense to the government,”262 a provision that has been carried forward to the 
present.263  Claims of a Gideon-like right to appointed counsel for the indigent 
in deportation proceedings have virtually always failed, though.  Forty years 
ago, some had thought that the implications of such cases as In re Gault264 
might carry the day.265  As one commentator put it in 1970: 
The consequences of deportation are often fully as grave as those of 
imprisonment . . . wrenching a person from his home since childhood, 
separating him from his wife and children, who may be American 
citizens, and sending him to a strange land or, even worse, leaving him 
with no country at all to which to turn.266 
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However, the lower courts have largely rejected this view and the Supreme 
Court has never resolved the issue.267  Does Padilla portend any change to this 
due process line of cases?  If so, one must apply its norms functionally and with 
an eye towards Sixth Amendment jurisprudence as well as towards deep norms 
of proportionality.268  Constitutional rules in the criminal justice system may 
provide useful analogies.  For example, in Graham v. Florida269 the Court held 
that a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender failed 
a disproportionality test.270  By analogy, consider the plight of refugees.  These 
are people who have proven that they have a well-founded fear of perse-
cution and yet they, too, may face deportation—perhaps to their death—for 
what are often relatively minor crimes.  A court might well see their situation 
as covered by Amendment V½ due to the harshness of the sanction, the 
convergence with the criminal system, and—as importantly—the difference 
that counsel can make.271  Recent studies have shown a wide disparity between 
represented and unrepresented asylum cases.  As one study noted, “whether an 
asylum seeker is represented in court is the single most important factor 
affecting the outcome of her case.  Represented asylum seekers were granted 
asylum at a rate of 45.6 percent, almost three times as high as the 16.3 percent 
grant rate for those without legal counsel.”272  Note that Amendment V½ goes 
well beyond the Mathews v. Eldridge test, in which courts must balance the 
private party’s interest and the risk associated with a wrongful determination 
against the government’s interests.273 
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But many long-term legal residents surely also have powerful claims under 
Amendment V½. Indeed, they are the ones about whom the Court was writing 
when it described deportation as a deprivation of “all that makes life worth 
living.”274 As Donald Kerwin has shown, the right to counsel is powerfully 
important in their deportation cases as well.275  As he noted, in 2003, a repre-
sentative year, “U.S. immigration courts completed 250,763 cases.  Noncitizens 
had legal representation in 120,033 (48 percent) of these cases and filed 
applications for relief in 89,360 cases (36 percent).  Represented, nondetained 
immigrants secured relief in 34 percent of their cases, in contrast to 23 percent 
of unrepresented, nondetained cases.  Represented detainees received relief in 
24 percent of their cases, compared to 15 percent for unrepresented detai-
nees.”276  Statistics since then have remained relatively consistent: From fiscal 
year 2005 through 2010, less than half of the noncitizens whose proceedings 
were completed were represented.  The percentage of those represented ranged 
from 35 percent to 43 percent.277  Success rates have also continued to show dra-
matic disparities, especially in asylum cases. In defensive asylum cases, 27 percent 
of applicants in 2007 who had representation were granted asylum, while only 
8 percent of those without representation were successful.278  The Constitution 
Project has reported that 3 percent of detained, unrepresented asylum seekers 
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were granted relief.279  However, a November 2009 report by the New York 
City Bar Justice Center report found that 39 percent of immigrant detainees 
it had interviewed at the Varick Federal Detention Facility had potentially 
meritorious immigration claims for relief.280  A recent comprehensive report 
issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also noted a vast 
array of serious due process concerns raised by systematic detention practices.281  
Additionally, many long-term residents without legal status, especially those 
for whom the DREAM Act282 is proposed, would seem to have strong claims 
under Amendment V½. 
Courts might also apply Padilla in light of the prevalence of incarceration 
in removal proceedings.  As the Court recognized long ago, “the prospect of 
imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused 
as a trivial or ‘petty’ matter, and may well result in quite serious repercussions 
affecting his career and his reputation.”283  Moreover, as the above statistics 
show clearly, detention makes a huge difference to outcomes in all sorts of 
deportation cases. 
Postdeportation claims raise particular problems under Padilla.  First, of 
course, there will frequently be a threshold question of whether Padilla is 
retroactive, a matter about which courts to date have split.284  Then there will 
be numerous problems of how to raise such claims procedurally.285  Perhaps 
most problematic is the fact that postdeparture motions to reopen and recon-
sider may be considered as barred.286  However, if we take seriously, as we must, 
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the recognition by the Supreme Court of the due process rights of permanent 
residents, we can see how, by analogy, the norms of Amendment V½ ought to 
govern at least those cases. 
Finally, we should never forget the deep relationship between human 
dignity and the right to counsel.  As David Luban has noted, “[t]he advocate 
defends human dignity by giving the client voice and sparing the client the 
humiliation of being silenced and ignored.”287  As he notes, poor litigants in 
particular may need legal representation because: 
They may be inarticulate, unlettered, [or] mentally disorga-
nized . . . . They may know nothing of the law and so [are] unable to 
argue its interpretation.  Knowing no law, they may omit the very facts 
that make their case, or focus on pieces of the story that are irrelevant 
or prejudicial.  They may be unable to utilize basic procedural rights such 
as objecting to their adversary’s leading questions.  Their voices may be 
nails on a chalkboard or too mumbled to understand.288 
These concerns are all the more important when one is representing—or 
seeking to represent—deportees. 
CONCLUSION 
“The Constitution does not take away with one hand what it gives with 
the other.”289 
 
In 1950, a federal judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania confronted 
the case of a foreign seaman who had been ordered deported after a hearing 
without counsel.  The man was ordered deported because he had been unable 
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to prove that he was a person of good moral character.  The hearing examiner 
relied on uncharged, allegedly criminal conduct to reach this conclusion.  
Although the judge saw the case through a conventional due process lens, his 
reasoning illustrates the sorts of norms that should govern such cases in the 
wake of Padilla.  The court noted that the government had informed the man 
that he had a right to counsel.  However, “[i]nforming a prisoner with total 
resources of $30.00, a stranger in a strange land with a complete lack of 
knowledge of the language of that country, that he had a right to counsel is 
almost an empty gesture.”290  Moreover, the court thought it crucial to look at 
substance rather than form.291  The court continued that it would: 
be a reflection upon the American system of jurisprudence if this 
impecunious alien in the light of all the circumstances were to have the 
legal consequences of deportation visited upon him without having a full 
and complete opportunity to present for the determination of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service all the facts adduced in the 
record before me.292 
This language, quaint though it may now sound, was written in an era 
when deportation was a relatively rare event, when discretionary relief was 
much more available than today, especially to permanent residents, when 
courts had jurisdiction to review deportation cases, and when deportees could 
stay their physical removal and file motions to reopen if new evidence was 
discovered.  Still, this court recognized even in that system the need for a strong 
version of due process.  This need is all the more compelling now.  Perhaps it 
has begun to be met by Padilla v. Kentucky.  The cases to which Amendment 
V½ most directly applies—those involving long-term permanent residents 
deported due to criminal convictions—have finally been recognized as worthy 
of constitutional scrutiny with more bite than has previously been required.  
This, however, is just the beginning of the damage reparation needed in the 
wake of the anachronistic formalism of the late nineteenth-century Court and 
the harsh, mean-spirited expansion of deportation by the late twentieth-
century political branches. 
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